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POLICY PAPER

A WELCOME THAT WORKS CHANGING MIGRATION TO BUILD OUR REGIONS

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A WELCOME THAT WORKS: CHANGING MIGRATION TO BUILD OUR REGIONS

JULIAN WOOD*

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The paper in summary...

Over the last 30 years, New Zealand has become over reliant on temporary work migration as a way to solve long-term labour and skills shortages. We have been happy to leave recommendations around the numbers and types of visas as almost the exclusive domain of officials and regulators who fine tune the points system in response to short-term economic, political, or lobby-group needs. This bureaucratic incrementalism has meant the use of the temporary migration visa pathway has crept from its humble beginnings of around 30,000 people in the early 1990's to become an ongoing stock of around 170,000 people who at any one time live and work in New Zealand on a temporary visa—a nearly six-fold increase without significant public debate.* Unfortunately this overreliance on temporary work visas undermines the long-term health of our communities, economies, and even the social licence of the overall immigration system itself.

We must acknowledge that there are many benefits to the status quo. It can be seen as a win-win for both New Zealand and the migrants who are enabled to temporarily come here and live and work, doing a job we want done all the while supporting themselves and often family back in their country of origin. Enabling people to work while on holiday means these visitors can stay longer and experience more of New Zealand just as New Zealanders can work in similar ways whilst overseas.

At the same time however, the ongoing and repeated use of temporary work visa solutions can have their downsides.

- Migrants can be vulnerable and exploited due to the temporary nature of their work and their understanding of local labour laws and regulations. For some this combines with their visa being tied to a single employer;
- Industries can become structurally dependent on temporary and low-wage workers from overseas and as a result underinvest in higher productivity solutions; and
- In areas dependent on temporary labour there can be a dampening effect on local wages and the employment of young people and beneficiaries.

The reality is that we are in danger of creating a two-tier labour market and society whereby some, especially low-skilled migrants, are seen simply as labour supply to be discarded should we meet economic headwinds or should they get sick. We should not be satisfied with a vision of migration that reduces people to economic units that are imported simply to maximise the welfare of “New Zealand Inc.” If the events of March 15, 2019 were not already enough warning that cracks in social cohesion are emerging it is sobering to find research that reports:

- Many New Zealanders hold a conflicting mix of ascriptive as well as inclusive views in regard to what it is to be a “true” New Zealander;
- A geographic polarisation of views in regard to migration is emerging between urban areas and New Zealand's regions, and
- Even after 12 years in New Zealand many migrants feel they “do not belong” or “belong not very strongly” in New Zealand

Alternative narratives already exist that can rebalance the economic narrative towards better long-term solutions. We need to empower our communities to welcome well, and we need to listen better to our indigenous people and make moves toward a “tika” system that embodies manaakitanga and a care for people. The alternative is that we continue to under-invest in the temporary— although often long-term— workers in our midst and they in turn under-commit to the long-term health of our communities.

* OECD, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: New Zealand 2014* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), 139, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264215658-en>; Keith McLeod and David Maré, *The Rise of Temporary Migration in New Zealand and Its Impact on the Labour Market*. (Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2013); Minister of Immigration and Minister for Workplace Relations and Safety, 'Cabinet Paper - Addressing Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation', 2018, <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/coef8d63eo/cabinet-paper-addressing-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation.pdf>.

In terms of our investment in those that chose to work here, New Zealand does already provide some with labour market assistance, language programs and special courses for non-principal applicants. But in considering best practice in other countries, we suggest that New Zealand should include:

- Making use of civics courses;
- Personalised settlement plans to ensure a wide awareness of settlement assistance options;
- Sports programmes as a positive way for migrants and communities to interact;
- Enabling regions to take a lead in settlement services;
- Allowing local policy variation so that communities can allocate points toward what they see as most valuable for their community; and
- Using welcoming policy as a way of refocusing on the host to ensure they can welcome well. New Zealand has in fact been running a 2-year Welcoming Communities Pilot Programme and Cabinet has agreed to expand Welcoming Communities Programme up to an additional 30 sites—a positive move that should be supported.

Overall, New Zealand needs to focus less on how many people arrive to join “New Zealand Inc” and more on how we treat the people who agree to move here. Rebalancing away from maximising the short-term gains that temporary migration can bring and toward a system that focuses on long-term outcomes is key to making this happen. Transforming New Zealand into a country that welcomes well will improve our ability to attract and retain migrants in the long-term, strengthen our communities, and improve the sense of belonging that migrants feel in our communities and our country.

As such we have the following 9 policy recommendations:

- 1:** Freeze the level of temporary work visa approvals at their current level. This would be the first step towards the gradual phasing out of the repeated use of low wage temporary visas as a way to meet ongoing skill shortages. Instead we would support a shift toward better long-term work migration solutions for low skill workers who would wish to live here permanently;
- 2:** Allow temporary migrants currently tied to a single employer to seek alternative employment within the same industry and location;
- 3:** Within the current Welcoming Communities Programme move more toward a ‘tika’ approach even if this means taking longer to expand;
- 4:** Expand the funding available within the Welcoming Communities Programme to include part provision for the scoping phase, innovative solutions aimed at addressing negative views towards migrants and the development of personalised settlement plans;
- 5:** Within the context of an “accredited” Welcoming Community allow specialised nomination of applicants and additional points in line with local preferences;
- 6:** Co-develop history courses to be delivered locally to adult migrants as part of the move toward compulsory history education in schools;
- 7:** Make use of personalised settlement plans as a way to overcome information gaps in regard to settlement services;
- 8:** Adopt the formal use of sports programmes for children of newcomers; and
- 9:** Introduce residency requirements to maintain permanent residency.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper takes a regional development lens on migration policy, seeking to understand freely-chosen international migration and what it might look like for regions to unlock the potential of immigration policy for the long-term health of their communities. It draws together administrative data on visa approvals, renewals, and transitions to permanent residency taken from Immigration New Zealand publications and places this within a wider body of information in regard to belonging, welcoming policy, and what it might mean to improve the way we invite people to become New Zealanders.

For too long, New Zealand has been satisfied to use short-term immigration measures to try to solve long-term labour market shortages. As long as we continue with these stop-gap measures we will continue to undermine the long-term health of our communities and even the social licence of the migration system itself. The time is right to explore and establish long-term local migration solutions, with a focus on belonging and being a good host.

Part of the overall problem is that decisions around the numbers of migrants are almost the exclusive domain of officials and regulators who fine tune a technocratic system in response to short-term economic, political, or lobby-group needs. This bureaucratic incrementalism with cabinet oversight has meant the use of the temporary migration visa pathway has crept from its humble beginnings of around 30,000 people in the early 1990s to become an ongoing stock of around 170,000 people who at any one time live and work in New Zealand on a temporary visa—a nearly six-fold increase.¹ What started as a response to short-term labour shortages has become a long-term solution to underlying structural issues without significant public debate.

We must acknowledge that there are many benefits to the status quo. It can be seen as a win-win for both New Zealand and the migrants who are enabled to temporarily come here to live and work. We previously advocated for an extension of the Regional Seasonal Employment (RSE) scheme, for example, to improve foreign aid outcomes.² Similarly, enabling temporary migrants to work while on holiday means these visitors can stay longer and experience more of New Zealand. For others on skills shortage visas, many have the opportunity to earn higher wages than they would have in their country of origin and use this to support family back in their country of origin.

At the same time however, we feel there is now a need to acknowledge that the ongoing and repeated use of temporary work visa solutions also has downsides. Migrants can be vulnerable and exploited due to the temporary nature of their work, their understanding of local labour laws and regulations and the lack of alternative options in the country of origin. For some this even combines with their visa being tied to a single employer. Industries can become structurally dependent on temporary and low-wage workers from overseas and as a result underinvest in higher productivity solutions. In areas dependent on temporary labour there is now also evidence of a dampening effect on local wages and the employment of local young people and beneficiaries.

The reality is that we are in danger of creating a two-tier labour market and society whereby some, especially low-skilled migrants, are seen simply as labour supply to be discarded should we meet economic headwinds or should they get sick. We are not interested in these migrants becoming New Zealanders because they are low skill or low wage and we deny these workers the same rights and freedoms we hold for ourselves. As we under-invest in the temporary workers in our midst they in turn can under-commit to the long-term health of our communities. The overall result is that community and societal cohesion increasingly comes under stress.

We must embrace a countervailing alternative narrative, one that focuses more on how we treat the people who agree to move here and less on the short-term economic gains of temporary migration. A narrative more along the lines of what Ian Pool suggests, one that

does not revolve around whether or not we should encourage migration, but how we can best welcome those people who have opted to move to New Zealand, in the process accommodating their needs and their cultures to our mix in a way that contributes to nation building yet endorses diversity...³

This paper will first examine the narratives that we employ when thinking about migration policy. To highlight the current choices we are making this will include a brief overview of the current migration pathways and cover the three big problems we see New Zealand facing when it comes to immigration policy, namely: attraction; retention; and belonging (which covers the problems associated with the continued use of short-term solutions). The paper will then examine

alternative options for improving settlement outcomes and social cohesion by focusing on welcoming policy. There are alternatives available to the current policy settings that can rebalance New Zealand toward longer-term migration solutions and focus us on welcoming and hosting well. These include:

- Reviewing the incremental growth and repeated use of temporary low-skill work visas as a way to solve what have become long term labour market shortages. Instead we would support a freeze on the absolute number of these temporary visas as a first step towards the gradual phasing out of the repeated use of low wage temporary visas and shifting toward long-term work migration solutions as a way to meet emerging structural issues.
- Ensuring communities and especially Māori are well engaged in any expansion of the Welcoming Communities Programme, even if this means taking longer to expand.
- Expanding the funding available within the Welcoming Communities Programme to include innovative solutions aimed at addressing negative views towards migrants and the use of personalised settlement plans within a welcoming community.
- Within the context of an “accredited” Welcoming Community, enable the nomination of applicants and additional points to be given according to local preferences. This for example could enable local communities to award extra points towards residency for migrants that learn te reo Māori or meet a local “centre of gravity” test.
- Co-developing history courses with local school input to be delivered locally via schools to adult migrants as well as their children (if any) as part of the move toward compulsory history education in schools.
- Making use of personalised settlement plans as a way to overcome information gaps in regard to settlement services.
- Adopting the formal use of sports programmes for children of newcomers as a way to increase positive and multifaceted contact between newcomers and the broader community.
- Instituting residency requirements to maintain one’s permanent resident status as a way to encourage people to re-consider citizenship.

2. IMMIGRATION NARRATIVES, NEW ZEALAND IDENTITY AND BELONGING

In our previous research entitled *Taking the right risks* we examined immigration policy as part of a suite of policy initiatives aimed at countering regional population ageing and decline.⁴ Overall, we argued that migration was unlikely to be able to counter demographic ageing and regional population decline in its totality (over the whole of New Zealand) but did propose that migration had the potential make a big difference to a local community.⁵ This was especially so if localised migration policy options could be combined with the use of settlement and welcoming policy.

In an attempt to move us toward a more spatially-focused form of migration policy however, it is necessary to step back and understand the rationale for the current model, its potential benefits and its potential blind-spots. There are good alternatives to the current heavily-centralised model, and a move toward effective welcoming policy can be the key that enables us to move past a simple economic narrative and unlock the regional benefits that spatial migration policy can bring.

New Zealand has a dominant economic narrative throughout its immigration policy settings

Peter Skilling’s academic work on immigration policy narratives in New Zealand argues that the dominant meta narrative applied to immigration policy is one that hinges on New Zealand being “a small and remote country in a hostile global environment...” and as such “[i]n response to the country’s endemic vulnerabilities, strategic action is required to defend and promote the meaningfully shared interests of all New Zealanders.”⁶

And indeed, the reality is that New Zealand has established an immigration regime that is capable of quickly responding to labour market skills shortages, natural disasters, or economic shocks. One can easily point to the role of migration policy in the Christchurch rebuild or see how “New Zealand... ..has long had an active policy of seeking immigrants to ‘grow’ its population and economy” as examples.⁷

Further to this, we have also elevated immigration

policy options to the status of a tradeable commodity and bargaining tool that we use in a global trade and diplomacy environments; an approach outlined in Fiona Barker’s work on the relationship between temporary migration and foreign policy goals outlines. As Barker says, immigration policy is now used to meet a “multiplicity of policy goals, including development, foreign policy, public diplomacy and trade objectives.”⁸


All this requires, however, that a number of elements work together. The first is that the decision making in regard to immigration changes is something the central government and officials largely maintain strategic control over, allowing them to bend policy settings to their overall needs—often without much public debate. The second is that our overall immigration framework has an inbuilt freedom for officials to adapt the rules of exclusion/inclusion in such a way that “...it is relatively easy to make changes to policy frameworks and settings without having to go through a process of legislative review and amendment.”⁹ The third is that our geography enables us to set the rules by which we include or exclude non-citizens from New Zealand. Our large sea borders mean we have a natural barrier made from the oceans around us.

We tend to view our migration policy like an exclusive club

New Zealand is therefore constantly fine-tuning migration policy choices at a very centralised technocratic level.¹⁰ In this way, New Zealand currently operates like an exclusive club, managed with the aim of maximising the happiness of existing members.¹¹ The Club Theory model in Figure 1 below portrays how this works: potential members are admitted or excluded up until the point that the marginal benefits of additional members are equal to the marginal costs of new admittances.¹²

This type of cost benefit analysis of membership can be used to explain or predict the outcomes of policy changes. For example, a higher minimum English language requirement ensures that any new member can speak well with existing members, hence lowering the marginal cost curve of club membership. This is shown in the figure above in the move from MC to MC'. The optimal membership numbers increase from point A to B where MB=MC'. Similarly, creating a temporary work visa category under which the costs of illness are born by the migrant themselves through private insurance

Figure 1: Club Theory



Source: Adapted from Grimmond (2005).¹³

has a similar effect. It would lower the marginal costs curve to long-term members meaning that more temporary migrants can be admitted. In this case we are moving some of the usually-internalised costs of club membership (in our case the costs associated with the provision of healthcare) onto temporary members while enjoying the benefits that new productive members bring.

While the club model has been extremely useful it has blind-spots

Placing the immediate economic costs and benefits of someone joining our club at the heart of the immigration system means we can lose sight of the wider and longer-term implications of our membership decisions. For example, viewing immigration this way, while highly technical and predictive, fails to capture how these ongoing choices in fact frame and change New Zealand society over time. The use of club theory also assumes that people inside the club are homogenous and maximise their happiness in similar ways. As such it doesn't reflect the social and cultural differences between individuals and within society. For example what maximises the happiness for one member may well not be optimal for others based on their different beliefs in regard to human dignity, the role of families, communities and indigenous peoples and culture.

A number of risks or blind spots in regard to social cohesion and belonging are becoming apparent

Indeed, the flexible, centralised, and incremental nature of the current system comes with quite a few blind-spots. First, by being so centralised it is difficult to balance the spatial, geographic, or local impacts on New Zealand society without reverting to simple “net benefit” arguments.¹⁴ Second, allowing the flexibility to make incremental changes to relieve short-term economic or political needs opens us up to the risk that we ignore the long-term consequences of our choices. After a while we inadvertently find ourselves at a destination that we would otherwise not choose to go given the stark “A/B” choice at the outset. Like a beagle with an extraordinary sense of smell but poor eyesight we are now almost blind to the dangers that are downwind but right in front of our face. Indeed it now appears there are a number of emergent risks in regard to social cohesion and belonging in New Zealand.

Many New Zealanders hold a conflicting mix of “ascriptive” as well as “inclusive” views in regard to what it is to be a “true” New Zealander

It turns out that despite what we might like to believe about ourselves, many New Zealanders have a range of inclusive and exclusive beliefs around what it means to be a “true” New Zealander. In the Social Attitudes Survey of New Zealand undertaken in 2015, University of Auckland academics Louise Humpage and Lara Greaves explored the personal characteristics that people in New Zealand associated with “truly being a New Zealander.”¹⁵ Their analysis highlighted that “respondents overall offered a relatively inclusive [and civic] understanding of what constitutes a New Zealander.”¹⁶ For example 93% of respondents believed that “feeling like a New Zealander” was important to truly being a New Zealander. Similarly, 91% held that “respecting NZ political institutions and laws” was fairly or very important.

At the same time however, many New Zealanders (and even migrants to New Zealand themselves depending on their migration characteristics) also held ascriptive (or exclusive) characteristics as part of their understanding of what it is to be a true New Zealander. These exclusive characteristics ranged from criteria that were either

difficult for migrants to meet —like having good English language (86% of respondents) or having lived the majority of your life in New Zealand (73%)—through to those that were impossible for immigrants to meet, like being born in New Zealand (70%). This, they argued, highlighted “potential issues for social cohesion and belonging in New Zealand...”¹⁷ and required New Zealanders to move beyond complacency or a “laissez-faire approach to its multicultural population” if it wants to avoid “ethno-nationalist feelings amongst some social groups that both exclude migrants and Māori from the national identity” from gaining ground.¹⁸

A geographic polarisation of views in regard to migration is emerging

Alongside the fact that many in New Zealand hold a complex web of ascriptive and inclusive views in regard to being a true New Zealander, work from a team of academics including Ron Johnston from Bristol University and Phillip Gendall, Andrew Trlin and Paul Spoonley from Massey University highlights a geographic “polarisation of views regarding the desirability of immigration and the consequent emergence of a more culturally diverse population and society.”¹⁹ This geographic polarisation appears to be based on the level of contact New Zealanders have with migrants, and they indicate that “[c]ontact with immigrants – especially frequent contact across a range of domains – is clearly linked with attitudes towards them... [a]nd since Auckland attracts a very high percentage of the country’s immigrants it is there that immigrants were most welcome and a culturally diverse population was more widely accepted.”²⁰ Supporting this “amount of contact” hypothesis is the finding that Aucklanders who do not have frequent contact with migrants are not as favourably disposed toward migrants as those that do. As such Johnston et al. endorse the recommendations of academics Ward and Masgoret from 2008 who argued that there is a need to “foster ‘contact under favourable circumstances’ – that is, intimate, cooperative, positive and equal status contact with shared common goals – and to do this via a variety of strategies and interventions.”²¹

Even after 12 years in New Zealand many migrants feel they “do not belong” or “belong not very strongly” in New Zealand

Evidence in regard to migrants’ sense of belonging in New Zealand over time is available as part of the 2012 New Zealand General Social Survey (NZGSS). The results are summarised for three categories of New Zealanders (New Zealand born with New Zealand born parents, overseas born recent migrants, and overseas born long term migrants) by selected regional areas (Total, Auckland, Wellington, Rest of North Island, Christchurch and rest of South Island) in Figure 2 below.²² The results highlight that even after 12 years of residing in New Zealand many migrants still feel like they “did not belong” or “belong not very strongly” in New Zealand (14% combined). While this is down on the 29 % that felt this way in their first 12 years, it’s important to keep in mind that 14% is more than double the 6% of respondents who were New Zealand born with New Zealand parents. Regionally the sense of belonging can be much worse that the national average. In Canterbury, 20% of long-term migrants still


feel that they don’t belong or belong not very strongly, quadruple the rate of the New Zealand-born with both parents native-born in Canterbury at only 5%.

Alternative narratives already exist that can rebalance the economic narrative towards better long-term solutions

We need not look far to find alternatives to our current narrative on immigration. We can read Māori contributions to our migration policy debates from the last three to four decades, many of which offer a vision of migration that looks broader than economics: rehumanising migrants and viewing migration policy as part of a community building exercise and including our responsibilities as hosts.

For example in 1993, Ranginui Walker’s article in the *Social Contract* argued that the shift away from a “bi-cultural” Treaty partnership to a narrative of a “multi-cultural” New Zealand identity diminished the status accorded of “Māori as an equal partner with the Crown.”²³

Figure 2: Strength of feeling of belonging in New Zealand in 2012



Source: Statistics New Zealand, The New Zealand General Social Survey (NZGSS) 2012, Dataset: Institutional trust, voting and strength of feeling of belonging to New Zealand by migrant status and regional centre, 2012, <http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/WBOS/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLECODE7909>, data extracted on 27 Jun 2019.

Walker posited that the Treaty of Waitangi protects the political agency for Māori to inform immigration policy direction. This agency was being ignored to the detriment of Māori and New Zealand and he argued that the Crown was at risk of defaulting on its Treaty obligations.²⁴ In 2007, Dame Tariana Turia reiterated Walkers position and overall frustration in her conversations about immigration policy as the co-leader of the Māori Party, adding that Māori “kaupapa, discusses manaakitanga, and the importance of creating effective and mutually respectful relationships.”²⁵ Reflecting on the relationship between the Crown and Māori she reiterated that Māori were not being heard. Rather she argued that “[i]f we are to honour the spirit of partnership explicit in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, Government must recognise the need to give effect to Māori involvement in immigration policy.”²⁶

In 2018, academics Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata pointed out that still “[t]here is a yawning hole in policy making and research relating to immigration; that is the exclusion of indigenous peoples and perspectives.”²⁷ In their work they outline and argue for a tika Māori approach to immigration based on manaakitanga “that recognises the unique status and rights of Māori as tangata whenua, but also gives substance to the fullness [of multi-culturalism].”²⁸ They also argued for “iwi to take a more substantial role in influencing migration policies that are meant to benefit the regions. In regions that are struggling to deal with demographic and economic decline, iwi leadership is critical.”²⁹

Manaakitanga is the “the process of showing and receiving care, respect, kindness and hospitality.”³⁰ The root of the word is mana — which can be seen as power, prestige, and authority. Aki means a reciprocal action. The suffix tanga normalises manaaki. “It captures notions of mutual care and respect for people, honouring one another or power sharing, and the protection of our environments.”³¹

Bridge-building between a tika system and current welcoming policy settings

This tika system outlined by Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata differs in many ways from the current system but aligns well with the Welcoming Communities Pilot Programme (discussed in more detail below). The strongest connection with welcoming policy is that the system would be “underpinned by care and respect and would go further in accommodating new migrants once they arrived.”³² Alongside this, it would also ease family reunification policy, provide for our Pacific neighbours as climate refugees from the Pacific, soften policy toward refugees as part of a response to the global refugee crisis, all while balancing the need to care for existing communities. In its proposed form the authors also argue that a tika system would recognise mana whenua by “having new citizens make an oath to both Treaty partners (rather than just the Crown) by pledging to uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi...”³³ It would also have implications for claims on resources and authority. One way that this might be expressed in the context of immigration policy would be to give additional points for migrants willing to learn te reo Māori, rather than just offering points for English language skills.³⁴

Overall, there is now a strategic opportunity for New Zealand to move forward by rebalancing and re-humanising our immigration system—placing care and respect for people at the heart. By including indigenous peoples and perspectives in policy making, we could move further toward a sense of manaakitanga: focusing on what it means to welcome well. This would also be a great step towards addressing the three big issues facing New Zealand in regard to immigration today: attraction, retention, and an over-reliance on short term solutions. While the current system is responsive to skill shortages, it fails to recognise that the unabated use of short-term immigration solutions is undermining the long-term benefits that longer-term migration can bring to our cities and places.

3. PROBLEMS OF ATTRACTION, RETENTION, AND AN OVER-RELIANCE ON SHORT-TERM SOLUTIONS THAT UNDERMINES SOCIAL COHESION.

3.1 Attraction: New Zealand is not a top tier migration destination, and the regions even less so

From the inside, New Zealand can feel like it is the best place in the world to live and work. Indeed, a World Gallup Poll in 2012 ranked New Zealand in top place with 89% of New Zealanders thinking that the city or area in which they live was a good place for immigrants from other countries to live.³⁵

Only 1% of potential migrants would choose New Zealand as the country they would move to

It is somewhat sobering then, to find that in other World Gallup polls conducted from 2010-2017 (see Table 1 for full rankings), New Zealand was only chosen by 1% of potential migrants as the country to which they would like to move. That New Zealand is ranked at all, let alone in 16th position might be seen by some as evidence that New Zealand doesn't have an attraction problem. Even 1% of potential migrants means somewhere in the order of 9 million people would choose to migrate to New Zealand. On the other hand, 1% pales in comparison to other countries on the list. America, in first place, had 22% of potential migrants worldwide saying they would like to move there, and Australia was ranked 5th overall in the world with 4%, or around 36 million potential migrants. This relative desirability gap is important to keep in mind, especially with the potential for New Zealand permanent residency to be seen as a back-door entry to more desirable locations like Australia. This issue will become more important over time as the world's population ages and increasingly countries compete for youthful migrants. At the moment, we are able to attract a range of skilled and unskilled migrants with relative ease. In the future it is likely we will face increasing competition from a range of developed countries as their population ages and they choose to move toward a more skills based targeted migration.

Table 1: Most desired destinations for potential migrants

"To which country would you like to move?"			
	2010-2012 %	2015-2017 %	Estimated number of adults (in millions)
United States	22	21	158
Canada	6	6	47
Germany	4	6	42
France	5	5	36
Australia	4	5	36
United Kingdom	7	4	34
Saudi Arabia	5	3	24
Spain	4	3	21
Japan	2	2	17
Italy	3	2	15
Switzerland	2	2	14
United Arab Emirates	2	2	12
Singapore	1	1	11
Sweden	1	1	9
China	1	1	9
New Zealand	1	1	9
Russia	1	1	8
Netherlands	1	1	7
South Africa	1	1	7
Brazil	1	1	6
South Korea	1	1	6
Turkey	1	1	6

Source: World Gallup Poll, 2017/18 <https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/750-million-worldwide-migrate.aspx> (last accessed 20 September 2019.)

A similar attraction problem emerges from the World Bank's Global Competitive Index. Here respondents from New Zealand and around the world were asked "Does your country attract talented people from abroad?" New Zealand placed 17th across all countries surveyed. Out of OECD countries (see Figure 3 over the page) New Zealand ranked 9th behind, Switzerland, Great Britain, America, Luxemburg, Ireland, Canada, the Netherlands, and Australia. Within APEC countries we ranked 7th. Once again however, Australia was seen as more able to attract global talent than New Zealand.

For those migrants we do attract the great majority of them enter on temporary work visa

There are two visa pathways for non-New Zealand citizens who want to migrate and work in New Zealand. The first is the temporary work visa pathway, which ends in the need for the person to either have transitioned to the second permanent resident visa pathway or to have left the country. The second pathway is the permanent resident pathway, which as the name suggests, allows the person to permanently reside and work in New Zealand, entering and exiting as they please.

Figure 4 below shows the numbers of approvals in these two broad categories over the 2016/17 June year. The visas that fall within the temporary work visa pathway are aggregated by visa policy within the orange box of the Figure 4.³⁶ The visas, that fall within the permanent pathway are within the light blue box which also further breaks these down into darker blue visa groupings. For example, in 2016/7 the Permanent Residence Approvals were 47,684. This consists of all those in the Skilled/Business (28,646), Family (15,017) and International/Humanitarian Groups (4,021). The Skilled/Business Group consists those on a Skilled Migrant Category visa (24,140) with those on the Residence to Work category (2,353) and the Business Category (2,012).

From the data we see that:

- New Zealand makes just under 5 temporary work visa approvals for each permanent residence approval given;
- Working Holidays Visas (WHV) make up a large proportion (70,002) of the temporary work visa pathway approvals (however, the expected stock of people in New Zealand over the 2016/17 year on these WHV's was about half this at around 32,000 people);³⁸
- The Family (35,755), Essential Skills (32,967) and Study to Work Visas (27,922) are all major contributors to the temporary visa pathway;
- There are a relatively low number of approvals within the International/Humanitarian stream (4,021). These numbers are roughly equivalent to 8% of those within the permanent stream, and a fifth of one percent (0.2%) of the stock of temporary workers in New Zealand at any one time;

- Skilled/Business visas account for 60 percent (28,646 visas) of the permanent stream total, and that the skilled migrant category accounted for most of these approvals (24,140 visas); and
- Similarly, the partnership category accounted for the majority of the Family residence approvals.

Two key elements are not apparent from the static analysis in Figure 4. The first is the growth in the use of temporary visas and hence the growth in the temporary workforce over the last 20 years.³⁹ This is a topic we will return to below, but for now, the use of the temporary migration visa pathway has grown from around 30,000 approvals in the late 1990s to become an ongoing stock of around 170,000 people on a temporary visa (who at any one time over a year live and work in New Zealand).⁴⁰ The second element not discernible, is that a temporary work visa can have a life span a few months right out to a length of four or even five years in total depending on the type of temporary work visa and renewals process. This means the stock and flow figures are even more important to understand as while someone might only be on a temporary work visa it may still well be worth investing in this person if they are to reside in New Zealand for a number of years.

Around half will transition from the temporary to the permanent visa stream (when excluding those on Working Holiday Visas)

For many, the temporary and permanent pathways interact. Taking all temporary visas between 2006/7 and 2011/12 as a stock and following their transition rates to permanent visas shows that roughly half (46%) will transition from a temporary to a permanent visa (if one excludes those on a WHV, refer to row entitled Total Excluding Work Hols in Table 2 below).⁴¹ The flip side of this analysis is that even after working in New Zealand for a number of years there is no discernible pathway to residence for around half of the people on a temporary visa, even though these people would be recorded as permanent and long term migrants within Statistics New Zealand calculations. For these workers a stand-down period of 12 months will apply before they can return to work in New Zealand.

Figure 3: New Zealand's capacity to retain, attract and use talent compared to OECD countries ranked by overall ability to attract 1-7 scale




Figure 4: Visa pathways by visa type and policy 2016/17




Table 2: Visa pathways for temporary workers who transitioned to residence by work visa type and resident visa type, 2006/07 to 2011/12 cohorts combined

		New Zealand Residence Programme stream					Total & After 5yr (%)	Not in NZ After 5yr (%)	Temp Worker After 5yr (%)
		Skilled Migrant Category	Residence from Work	Family	International/ Humanitarian	Other			
Temporary Workers Stream (< 5years)	Working Holiday	1,787 68%	26 1%	815 31%			2,628 1%	260,172 99%	
	Family	20,611 35%	1,767 3%	34,745 59%	589 1%	589 1%	58,889 66%	30,337 33%	
	Essential Skills	34,896 87%	401 1%	2,407 6%	1,883 4%	401 1%	40,110 46%	47,086 54%	
	Study to Work	12,183 95%		513 4%			12,824 41%	18,454 58%	
	Work to residence	3,690 59%	2,439 39%	63 1%			6,254 59%	4,631 41%	
	Other	6,059 66%		1,194 13%	1,194 13%	734 8%	9,181 15%	50,911 85%	
	Total*	79,226	4,633	39,735	3,666	1,724	~129,900 24%	~411300 75%	
	Total excluding Work Hols					~127,300 46%	~151,100 54%		
Student Stream	Full Fee-Paying Student					28%	68%	3%	

Data Source: Author's own calculations based on Table 5.1, 5.3, and 5.6 in MBIE (2018)⁴² *Note the rows and columns do not always sum due to rounding in the source documents.

The temporary visa with the highest transition rate and highest number were for those on a family visa with two thirds transitioning to the residence programme stream. Interestingly only 59% of these moved to a family residence visa with 35% transitioning to a skilled migrant category. Roughly half of those who had a temporary essential skills visa transitioned to a permanent residence visa with 87% of these moving to the skilled migrant category. Only 28% of those who were in New Zealand as full fee-paying students transitioned to the permanent stream, with 68% no-longer residing in New Zealand after five years.

The majority of permanent residence applications are made by people already in New Zealand

According to MBIE “75 per cent of residence applications were for people already in New Zealand.”⁴³ This reflects the extensive use of temporary visas as a pathway to permanent residence. Acceptance rates for these applications vary from 86% of all Skilled/Business Stream applications to 22% for Parent Category applications as part of the family stream. In contrast, nearly all refugee

approvals were made while the person was residing offshore.

The majority of both temporary and permanent migrants choose to live in our major centres

Unfortunately for the wider regions, the majority of both temporary and permanent migrants choose to settle in our larger cities. As one might expect, Auckland takes the lion’s share. Three-quarters of permanent Skilled Migrants are employed in either Auckland, Canterbury or Wellington. “In 2016/17 the main regions of employment for SMC principal applicants were Auckland (47 per cent), Canterbury (17 per cent) and Wellington (10 per cent),” notes MBIE, “the main regions of employment have remained broadly the same since 2013/14.”⁴⁴

Similarly, when it comes to the locational variation of temporary workers on “essential skill visas”, 2016/17 statistics show that 78% had an address in one of the four main centres—Auckland (38%), Canterbury (18%), Otago (15%) or Wellington (7%). Only about one in five in 2016/17 had an address in a region other than

those already listed or their address was classified as unknown.

Recent New Zealand research conducted by Motu considers the significant role that amenities play in attracting both domestic and foreign migrants. It found that international migrants were “more attracted to cities with productive amenities [railyards, air and shipping ports and high-speed internet services] whereas domestic migrants are more attracted to places with consumption amenities [libraries, parks, cycle-ways, cultural facilities, skate parks etc].”⁴⁵

In summary, while we rate ourselves as a great place for people to migrate to, New Zealand has a multilayer attraction issue. First New Zealand is not as relatively attractive when compared with other nations like Australia. As argued above this issue will become more important over time as the world’s population ages and increasingly countries compete for youthful migrants. It is likely we will face increasing competition to attract youthful migrants from a range of developed countries as their population ages and they choose to move toward a more skills based and targeted migration. Second, when it comes to the migrants that do choose to come here, the majority live and work in our major centres. Alongside this, roughly half of those that do arrive on temporary visas (excluding WHV’s) find themselves unable (or unwilling) to move here permanently. We will explore the attractiveness of smaller communities and their ability to differentiate themselves to through the strategic use of welcoming policy, but first we need to outline the second problem facing New Zealand, that of retention post residence.

3.2 Retention: Many migrants re-migrate post residence

Attracting migrants is one thing, retention is another. The evidence suggests that New Zealand struggles to retain talented people. Using World Bank global competitiveness data that asks respondents whether their country retains talented people, we see New Zealand drop from 17th in the world in attraction to 31st place overall in the ability to retain talent.⁴⁶ Australia, in comparison, holds its own, and even improves to 3rd place among APEC countries. The standout country when it comes to retention appears however to be Norway, which rises from well below New Zealand in world attraction rankings (number 20) all the way up to 4th place.

*Roughly 25% of skilled migrants remigrate, either back home or to another country, within five years of taking up residence in New Zealand*⁴⁹

When looking at the likelihood of remigration, New Zealand research undertaken for MBIE by Eric Krassoi-Peach in 2013 highlights that even with a higher retention rate than other countries, roughly a quarter of skilled migrants to New Zealand will leave New Zealand within 5 years.⁵⁰ Within this five-year window, the authors also find a significant spike in the likelihood of remigration straight after two years of residence in New Zealand noting that “[t]his two year point is significant because after two years of residing in New Zealand (with certain conditions) migrants earn an indefinite right to return to New Zealand should they choose to remigrate to another

Table 3: Ranking of selected country capacity to attract, retain, and efficiently use talent (World ranking, OECD ranking and APEC ranking)

Selected Countries	Global attract	Global retain	OECD attract	OECD retain	APEC* attract	APEC* retain
NZ	17	31	9	20	7	11
Australia	16	24	8	15	5	3
Canada	10	14	6	9	4	5
Singapore	2	6			1	2
USA	6	2	2	5	2	1
Norway	20	4	11	3		
Out of	140	140	36	36	21	21

Source: Global Competitiveness Index, 2015-16, Authors ranking calculations for APEC and OECD. *in APEC both Papua New Guinea and Brunei are excluded due to lack of available data. Dataset downloaded on 10 April 2019.

Box 1: Local responses from Norway⁴⁷

Møre and Romsdal is a north eastern county in Norway with a total population of roughly 265,000 of which roughly 50,000 live in one large town Ålesund, with the rest spread over two other smaller towns (Molde and Kristiansund) and 35 smaller municipalities. Together they identified that the county had a continuous shortage of engineers and other high skilled workers largely due to the a lack of an international school, the low numbers of migrants who could speak Norwegian, and the low employment opportunities of the spouses of desired migrants, and set out the following solutions:

No international school: The solution was for the Ålesund Chamber of Commerce in partnership with local business and authorities to create an international school as a non-profit foundation. Norwegian state agreed to pay 85% of the cost of the school.

Lack of local language: Local schools now offer low fee courses and firms also provide language courses to their employees. The County has also pushed out its municipal services to rural towns — it operates drop-in service counters for the public and ensures that it has English speaking staff available.

Spouses: Local firms are active in trying to identify possible employment opportunities in rural towns for the spouses of the employees.

Their local findings in regard to role of the employment of spouses is confirmed in wider OECD research that found “[i]n Norway, labour migrants with an inactive partner are more likely to leave the country than those with an employed partner, no matter the country of origin and the gender of the principle migrant. For [male migrants in Norway], the retention was almost twice as high when the spouse was working.”⁴⁸

country.”⁵¹ They also note that New Zealand’s choice to confer an indefinite right of return to permanent residents is unique in the world, and significantly lowers the opportunity cost of remigration for those willing to try to migrate to another country.

Post-five-year remigration rates remain high so that by year nine the overall retention rate is less than 66%

For most OECD countries migrant outmigration or remigration occurs within the first five years. Unfortunately for New Zealand, MBIE analysis undertaken in 2012 found that even out to nine years remigration rates are high. The overall retention rate is less than two thirds after about nine years.⁵²

It’s often higher skilled migrants that are more likely to leave

OECD research also highlights that the skilled migrants choosing to leave New Zealand are often those with a master’s level education and above, whereas those with

a lower levels or even no qualifications were more likely to stay.⁵³ They argue that a number of factors might help explain this effect. One reason could be that the “wage premia for higher qualification levels in New Zealand are among the lowest in the OECD,”⁵⁴ meaning people (including both New Zealand born and migrants) are leaving for higher wages elsewhere in the world. Another potential explanation already mentioned earlier: the ability for migrants to gain permanent residence with unlimited right of return after two years and the relative ease with which New Zealand residents can move to work in Australia. To all the above, we would like to add that a migrant’s sense of belonging in New Zealand as discussed in Section 2 is also an important consideration.

3.3 Reliance: The ever-increasing use of “temporary” migration solutions

The ongoing use of temporary migration solutions means that the stock of temporary workers in New Zealand at any one time has grown to 170,000 workers in the 2017/18 year

There has been a six-fold increase in temporary worker visa approvals over the last 20 years, from a base of around 35,000 approvals in 2000/01 to over 200,000 approvals in 2016/17.⁵⁵ This means there was approximately 150,000 people at any one time available to work on a temporary visas in New Zealand in 2016/17 and that this number has increased to around 170,000 in the 2017/18 year.⁵⁶


Whether having a temporary worker number of this magnitude is a positive or negative is disputed. Some will argue this is only roughly equivalent to only 6% of New Zealand’s seasonally adjusted total employment, which in June 2017 was around 2,541,000 people.⁵⁷ Others will point out that this is also roughly equivalent to the total urban area population of Tauranga, New Zealand’s fifth largest urban area by population and indeed by 2017/18 had grown larger still. As New Zealand researchers Julie Fry and Peter Wilson point out however, over this

timeframe the number of permanent residency visas has remained fairly constant and it is in fact “the growth in temporary work permits and student visas that is driving the increase in Statistics New Zealand’s category of ‘permanent and long-term migration’” which is the headline figure that gets most media attention.⁵⁸

*The share of temporary workers is particularly high in a few lower-wage and lower-productivity sectors and in some regions*⁵⁹

While the majority of migrants choose to reside in our largest centres, the “share of temporary workers is particularly high in a few lower-wage and lower-productivity sectors and in some regions.”⁶⁰ Three industries appear to disproportionately rely on the use of temporary migrants: Food Services, Administrative and Support Services and Agricultural Forestry and Fishing (as can be seen in Figure 5 below). For example, over 20% of the average monthly share of total jobs in the accommodation and food service industry were undertaken by people classified as temporary migrants. Similarly, just under 20% of the share of total jobs in administrative and support services industry are undertaken by temporary migrants. This category includes contractors or employees with “Employment Placement and Recruitment Services,” “Labour Supply Services,”

Figure 5: Percentage of jobs held by temporary migrants (students, employer-assisted and open) by sector May 2010 and May 2016



Source: Cabinet paper last accessed 22 August 2019⁶¹

and workers “engaged in activities such as building and other cleaning services; pest control services; gardening services; and packaging products for others.”⁶¹

There are now places and occupations that are heavily reliant on temporary migration


Deeper analysis of the temporary migrant share of employment for each industry and region, 2000–2015 by MBIE highlights how wide spread the use of temporary migration has become across New Zealand’s regions. In almost every region different industries are now heavily reliant on temporary migration to fill their employment needs. For example, 41% of employment in agriculture and fishing support services in Tasman, Nelson, Marlborough, West Coast, is taken up by temporary migrants. In the Bay of Plenty the share is 28%; 22% in Gisborne and the Hawkes Bay. While the national average temporary migrant share on employment for dairy cattle

farming is 7%, the regions of Canterbury (20%), Otago (13%) and Southland (16%) are all heavily reliant on temporary migrants.

While a net benefit to New Zealand, widespread temporary migration does have negative effects on beneficiaries and new hires of young people, especially in non-main urban areas

When MBIE undertook a study into “The Rise of Temporary Migration in New Zealand and its Impacts on the Labour Market” in 2013, they were “unable to find any evidence [of] adverse consequences for the employment of New Zealanders overall.”⁶³ This study was updated in 2018 and the overall effects were largely unchanged with “no significant indications of migrants crowding out New Zealanders for jobs” found.⁶⁴ Temporary migration was

Figure 6: Regions with high share of temporary migrant employment (months) by industry 2000-2015



Source: Appendix D in MBIE (2018)

found to have “some positive effects on the earnings of New Zealanders 25 years” and older, but not for youth, and they found no effects on new hires.⁶⁵

The research undertaken in 2018 did, however, offer a more intricate analysis of the effects over different time periods, different locations, different industries, and different types of temporary visas and found “effects of temporary migration that are not evident in the overall results.”⁶⁶

This included place-based variation between urban and non-urban areas, where in “main urban areas temporary migration appeared to have positive effects on new hires of youth and beneficiaries,” and in “non-main urban areas found negative effect on beneficiary hires, but positive effects on earnings of New Zealanders 25 years+ and all New Zealanders.”⁶⁷ Across time, we also see a negative effect of the new hires of beneficiaries (in 2001-2005) whereas in later periods (2006-2010 and 2011-2015) the authors found positive effects for new hires of youth. It appears that while most New Zealanders were benefiting from the use of temporary migration, there appeared to be a negative impacts on beneficiaries in non-main urban areas especially in the earlier years.

MBIE also observed the following effects in various regions, industries, and visa-type groups.

- Horticultural regions – negative effects on new hires of beneficiaries
- Food services industry – positive effects on new hires of all groups except beneficiaries, where they saw no effect
- International students – positive effects on new hires of youth and beneficiaries
- Study to Work visa – negative effects on new hires of youth
- Essential Skills visa – negative effects on new hires of New Zealanders as a whole
- Family visa – negative effects on new hires of New Zealanders and beneficiaries
- Auckland – positive effects on earnings of New Zealanders 25 years+

Based on the results of the updated 2018 data, there is a case for questioning the ever-increasing use of temporary work visas without further research to understand the

overall impacts on local labour markets conditions. While no overall negative impacts were found in the aggregate data, the distribution of negative and positive effects are not evenly felt across industries, place, timeframes, visa category, or by different groups of New Zealanders.


There is a risk that what has started as a temporary labour shortage has now become a structural dependency on temporary labour

From a more long-term, structural labour market perspective there is a risk that the on-going use of temporary migration solutions are now having adverse impacts on the overall structure of the labour market, including the willingness of firms to invest in higher wages, or labour-saving techniques. Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley’s theory on the perpetuation of immigrant sectors in their literature review of “Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers” undertaken for the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, in 2014 clearly illustrates how this self-reinforcing cycle can occur. It ends up with the duration and size of the migrant labour force steadily increasing and becoming a “structural demand” issue for employers, one that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that negatively impacts on wage level, innovation and the desirability of the industry as a place of work for domestic workers.

We have created a two-tier employment system that severely limits temporary migrant workers’ bargaining power, and their access to healthcare, higher education for children and many social services

Temporary work visas that are tied to an employer mean an employee cannot leave the employer and seek work elsewhere. This in effect gives an employer monopsony power: a clear one sided power imbalance over the worker. On the one hand the vetting of employers by Immigration New Zealand is one way to ensure that employers are not taking advantage of their workers. On the other hand modern forms of contracting out, piecework (whereby someone gets paid according to the number of fruit the pick or garments they produce), and a general lack of regulatory enforcement combined with language and culture difficulties for many migrants means that this one sided arrangement of bargaining

Figure 7: Circle of perpetuation of immigrant sectors



Source: Figure 2 in Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley, 'Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A Literature Review' (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, March 2014), 50.⁶⁸

power appears open to many abuses. We do not accept this level of bargaining imbalance anywhere else in our labour relations framework and it is time to reconsider its widespread use for temporary work visas.

Alongside this, the provision of government subsidised services to migrants on temporary work visas can depend on the type of service required, the level of that service that is required, or in other cases the duration of your temporary work visa combined with a previous visa. For example, government subsidised access to:

- Healthcare is only given if the workers temporary visa allows them to work in New Zealand for two years or more; or if they can combine their current visa period with the “visa immediately prior to it on which you were in New Zealand for the balance of two years;”⁶⁹
- Education for dependent children is the same as for “domestic children” for primary and secondary schooling for as long as the year in which the primary work visa lasts. Tertiary education is only available at a full fee-paying rate;⁷⁰ and

- Social assistance in the form of benefits, accommodation supplements or in-work tax credits are not available if the migrant is “in New Zealand or here on a temporary entry class visa or temporary permit.”⁷¹ This in effect compounds the monopsony power an employer may have as there may be no short-term ability to support oneself or a family if the worker is being taken advantage of.

Current settings mean that temporary migrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation

The use of both temporary migrant labour and the rise of precarious, temporary work has become a “much more significant part of the labour market,” according to a 2014 MBIE report into “Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers.”⁷² The report concludes that the issue of vulnerable workers “deserves much more attention if New Zealand is to monitor and manage the contemporary labour market and achieve a range of economic and social benefits.”⁷³ It also notes that “[t]he temporality of both migrant status and work means there are few

protections from any quarter”⁷⁴ with “limited evidence of interventions that currently operate, much less are successful.”⁷⁵ They highlighted the “need to focus on the horticulture, viticulture, dairying, health care, elder care, domestic work or hospitality with a particular focus on women, remittance workers, international students, employment and work, non-standard work, and health and safety.”⁷⁶

In response to the growing potential for exploitation, the Government has announced a number of changes. A new “Temporary Work Visa” has been announced, which combines the Essential Skills visas, Approval in Principle visa, Work to Residence – Talent (Accredited Employer) visas, Work to Residence – Long Term Skills Shortage List Occupations visa, Silver Fern Job Search visa, and the Silver Fern Practical Experience visa into one visa called the Temporary Work Visa. All employers wanting to use an employer assisted Temporary Work Visa will be required to undertake an employer check to ensure they are meeting “minimum employment and immigration regulatory standards, and that they are taking steps to reduce exploitation.”⁷⁷ For employers with a high volume of migrant workers (defined as more than five migrant workers in a 12 month period) or in the labour hire sector “more comprehensive checks and additional standards” will be required.⁷⁸

Alongside this, the Government will roll out “Sector Agreements.” These will include agreeing to a workforce plan and the conditions to be met for recruiting foreign workers for specified key occupations. The Agreements will be negotiated with sectors that have a high reliance on temporary foreign workers (especially in lower-paid occupations). Employers who are recruiting foreign workers for occupations covered by a Sector Agreement will be required to comply with the agreement. The sector, in return for access to temporary workers via immigration, will be required to make commitments and demonstrate progress towards placing a greater share of New Zealanders into jobs in the sector and reducing the sector’s reliance on temporary foreign workers over time. The first Sector Agreements to be negotiated are proposed for the residential care and meat processing sectors in late 2019 although the results of these negotiations have yet to be announced and their actual status is unknown.⁷⁹

Overall the continued use of short-term solutions is now risks undermining long-term migration solutions

The use of short-term and long-term migration go hand in hand, but there are trade-offs with both kinds of migration. As previously outlined, there are many positives to the increased use of temporary migration, including the fact that 75% of applications to the permanent stream come from people already residing in New Zealand on some form of a short-term visa. This has, as we already mentioned earlier, had a positive influence on New Zealand’s five-year retention rate. But the international evidence suggests there are negative effects also.

In Canada and Australia we see that the relative perception and treatment of temporary migrants has a significant influence of the way society views migration policy overall. This is because short-term and or recent migrants often have no easy way to learn and understand local customs, regulations or laws and this can have spill-over effects for all migrants, even to second and third generation citizens who have similar observable characteristics to recent arrivals. Evidence from Canada where temporary work migrants (like New Zealand) have limited access to federally funded settlement programs, show that these migrants often struggle to integrate and in practice, local communities find it difficult to tell temporary workers and long-term migrants apart.⁸⁰ In Canada this has led to tensions between the need for settlement assistance (as perceived by those locally providing settlement assistance) and the ability to fund this settlement assistance when the person there on a temporary visa doesn’t meet the funding criteria.

Evidence from rural Queensland in Australia suggests that “if new people did not attempt to integrate or, as in the case of many teachers, indicated they were only staying a maximum of two years, locals were less accepting and accommodating.”⁸¹ It is likely then, that the continued use of short-term migration (even for those staying up to two years) may mean that migrants themselves underinvest in the long-term health of the community, and the community underinvests in ensuring the temporary migrant is settling well. This not only undermines social cohesion, but also has the potential to undermine the perception of migration as a positive policy tool.⁸²

3.4 The Three Big Problems overall

New Zealand needs to accept that we are not a top-tier destination for many migrants and that increasingly our focus on skilled migration will come under pressure as other countries age and increasingly compete for shrinking pool of potential skilled migrants. Part of this is to acknowledge that we already have both a relative attraction issue in relation to our nearest migrant competitor Australia and that some migrants see our relative lack of requirements for permanent residency as a back door to other countries. All this compounds the wider problem we have in retaining the skilled migrants that choose to move here.

Alongside all this we have repeatedly tried to solve long term labour market issues via the use of temporary migration solutions. While this might be a low cost way for industries to meet short-term labour market pressures there is now mounting evidence that this is not low cost for society overall. Many low wage and low skill industries are now becoming dependent on low wage migration as a permanent solution to their labour shortage needs. As a result they are underinvesting on higher productivity solutions and dampening long term growth. There is now also evidence that in certain industries and locations low wage temporary workers are having a negative impact on the employment of beneficiaries or youth. Overseas evidence also points to the fact that repeated use of temporary migration solutions can mean that communities underinvest in the temporary migrants in their midst, and that migrants can also underinvest in their communities. All of this impacts negatively on overall social cohesion and results in the potential undermining of migration as a positive policy tool overall.

While all this paints a relatively negative picture, there are a number of ways forward to improve overall outcomes. There are lessons we can learn from overseas literature and even our recent history in immigration policy and settlement services. Parts of the overall migration systems here and overseas are constantly being reviewed and pilot programmes tested and evaluated. Hence this is where we turn next as we look at a range of international solutions aimed at improving long term settlement outcomes, social cohesion and their use in New Zealand with a particular focus on welcoming policy.

4. INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS AIMED AT SETTLEMENT AND RETENTION AND THEIR USE IN NEW ZEALAND

In 2014, New Zealand developed a Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy⁸³ and we do currently have a range of settlement and integration services. Academics also point out in New Zealand there is a “prevailing ethos that for most [especially skilled migrants] they are perfectly capable of establishing themselves in New Zealand.”⁸⁴ We need to learn from overseas examples that show what it might look like to promote a longer term perspective on migration. A wide range of initiatives are used around the world aimed at improving the settlement outcomes for migrants. These solutions can either be focused on the individual migrants or focused on improving the readiness and ability of a community to host migrants.

Table 4 (below) provides a cross-country comparative analysis of settlement and integration initiatives of 13

countries including New Zealand. Based on data from the Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement in Canada, it captures the cross-country incidence of these services. The following discussion assesses how these policies have been used in New Zealand, and if not already implemented here, what potential they might hold for our context.

Labour market assistance and language programmes are used everywhere

All countries studied—including New Zealand—make extensive use of both labour market assistance and language programs. While the specifics of the programmes vary widely from country to country, the general trend across countries in both areas is for an increasing involvement of the not-for-profit sector in delivery (which will be discussed separately below), and for the migrant to make part payment for assistance, especially in meeting the cost of language courses.⁸⁶ Both trends are evident in New Zealand. Having said this, a number of countries also provide incentives in the form of part payment for settlement services. Canada,

Table 4. Incidence of settlement and integration services by country

	Civics and Integration Courses	Personalized Settlement Plans	Pre-arrival Courses	Settlement Strategies	Sports programmes	Mandatory Contracts	Special Courses for Spouses / Children	Labour Market Assistance	Language Courses	Welcoming community / city
Germany	●m	●		●	●		●	●	●	●
France	●m	●	●			●	●	●	●	
Italy								●	●	
Spain				●	●	●	●	●	●	
Belgium	●m							●	●	
United States					●		●	●	●	●
Netherlands	●m	●						●	●	
New Zealand			●	●			●	●	●	●
Denmark	●v			●	●		●	●	●	
Sweden	●v	●						●	●	
Ireland	●v	●			●			●	●	
England	●v	●		●	●		●	●	●	●
Australia	●v	●	●		●			●	●	●
Canada			●	●			●	●	●	●
Total	9	7	4	6	7	2	8	14	14	6

Source: Author based on information contained within John Shields and Julie Drolet, 'Immigrant Settlement and Integration Services and the Role of Non-profit Providers: A Cross-National Perspective on Trends, Issues and Evidence', RCIS Working Paper Series 2016/1 (February 2016): 64⁸⁶ and wider documents regarding welcoming policy. Where M=mandatory, V=voluntary

for example, provides the rough equivalent of NZ\$4000 per permanent immigrant to help their settlement in Canada.⁸⁷ As mentioned above however even in Canada, there are many temporary work migrants (who may be residing for a number of years) who are unable to access this funding due to not being on a permanent visa that settlement service agencies argue are in need of settlement assistance.

This dual focus on language acquisition and helping a migrant finding work is both unsurprising and important for New Zealand. Evidence from Henderson's (2002) study of skilled Chinese immigrants in Auckland, highlighted the many benefits that flow from finding suitable employment including:

*opportunities for workplace contact, social interaction and the shared experiences necessary for the development of friendships with host society members; and as an economic, social or institutional prerequisite to membership of – and hence additional contact opportunities in – professional, recreational and other host society voluntary associations.*⁸⁸

Special courses for non-principal applicants are also widely used

Both international evidence from the OECD and New Zealand consultation with recent migrants in New Zealand suggests that support for non-principal applicants is key for overall settlement outcomes. New Zealand consultation with recent migrants for example finds that the “[p]artners of both residence and work visa holders more commonly experienced difficulties compared with residence and work visa principal applicants across a range of settlement areas.”⁸⁹ Finding a job is one of the areas where the experience of the spouse plays a key role in longer term retention. “In the Netherlands, for example the probability of high skilled labour migrants staying five years after arrival is 18 percentage points higher if the spouse is working rather than inactive or unemployed.”⁹⁰ Similarly as outlined in Box 1 earlier: “[i]n Norway, labour migrants with an inactive partner are more likely to leave the country than those with an employed partner, no matter the country of origin and the gender of the principle migrant. For [male migrants in Norway], the retention was almost twice as high when the spouse was working.”⁹¹

New Zealand does make use of special courses for spouses, women, and children, including having above average international access to childcare and the provision of primary and high school education for children of migrants. New Zealand also uses pre-approval language policy and then a compulsory learning policy to “require certain family members to demonstrate that they speak English or to pre-purchase a language class, paying the NZ authorities in advance for their future course. The fees for these courses depends on the level of English demonstrated and ranges from NZD \$1700 to NZD \$6700.”⁹²

Having said this, the recent changes to the Family Visa by the current Government mean that non-principal applicants—while able to apply for residence—will face a formal labour market test like primary applicants before they are eligible to work in New Zealand. This formal barrier may compound the already existing informal barriers that non-primary applicants can have, like lesser language ability than their spouse (despite pre-paid courses) and the lack of built-in networking opportunities through participation in work.

New Zealand's use of a formal barrier to employment is aimed at balancing the need for work with research findings that found that family work visas were crowding out beneficiaries in certain labour markets. It is important to consider, however, the international research that points towards a strong positive correlation between long-term retention and spousal employment rates. Therefore, while avoiding crowding out beneficiaries recent changes may compound the remigration rate of high skilled applicants to the overall detriment of New Zealand.⁹³

New Zealand is an international outlier in not making use of civics courses

The next most common form of settlement policy used internationally was civic instruction (by 9 of the 13 countries covered). These nine countries are divided into four who opted to make it compulsory and five who use it as a voluntary tool. Some, like England in the voluntary group, only provide it as a service for refugees. Germany, on the other hand, combines its compulsory requirement with financial assistance for participation and sanctions (reduced social transfers for migrants in receipt of welfare or the refusal of a permanent residence permit) for those that refuse to participate.⁹⁴ France uses both sanctions

and benefits, with successful completion of the civics course leading to a longer (10 year) residence permit, and failure to complete resulting in either a limited (one year with one renewal) or no residence permit.

New Zealand was one of the five outlier countries that did not use any formal civic instruction, fitting with our largely hands-off approach to settlement. This approach to history and culture education is puzzling, especially given the recent move for New Zealand history to become compulsory in New Zealand schools from 2020 onwards. The introduction of compulsory New Zealand history in schools provides the political impetus and an opportunity for some form of civics or more broader citizenship education to be developed that aligns with the national curriculum.⁹⁵

Academic work on citizenship education for adult migrants in Canada in 2005 suggests that there needs to be a significant commitment on behalf of the government to fund and find a way to deliver these courses in a way that separates them from the process of economic integration and goes beyond simply passing of a citizenship test. This literature states that this kind of government investment is crucial in moving newcomers in an increasingly global and individual/consumer-based environment move beyond seeing the state as a provider of services to seeing it as something of a participatory process.⁹⁶ A 2017 evaluation of the settlement programme in Canada supports this position by finding that “refugees... and family class immigrants had more knowledge about laws, rights and responsibilities than federal skilled workers. This [the authors argue] may be attributable to specific support and orientation immigrants may have received under the Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP), or through sponsors or family members.”⁹⁷ This bolsters the argument that even highly skilled migrants who are largely left alone in their settlement sphere in New Zealand would benefit from some of the additional supports given to refugees as part of the settlement process.

*Many countries use **personalised settlement plans** to ensure a wide awareness of settlement assistance options*

Just over half the countries (7 out of 13) used personalised settlement plans which customise a settlement plan to an individual migrant’s needs. Again, New Zealand takes a hands-off approach in this area aside from pre-approval

criteria (for non-humanitarian stream migrants), largely relying on the migrant’s ability to navigate settlement assistance themselves. This assumption can be called into question given the findings of consultations undertaken in 2018 into recent migrants’ experience of settling and adjusting to life in New Zealand. A common theme found was “a lack of awareness that information was available and where to find it... [t]here were also instances of participants not being aware of key support groups such as local migrant networking groups, and services available to them such as the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB), Work Connect and Local Council initiatives.”⁹⁸ There is a solid rationale, therefore, to move toward introducing personalised settlement plans, especially if this becomes part of broader shift toward a welcoming policy focus.

Sports programmes are increasingly used and seen as a positive way for migrants and communities to interact

Sports programmes have proven effective at building relationships between migrants and the community. Shields and colleagues noted that “[w]hile integration through sports programming is primarily aimed at children there is also beneficial effects for parents since they are able to interact with non-immigrant parents during sports practices and matches.”⁹⁹ While Immigration New Zealand reports that an increase in the proportion of recent migrants who belong to social networks (including sports groups) would signify successful inclusion, we could not locate any formal sports settlement programs in New Zealand outside of those events run through the welcoming communities pilot programme on an ad-hoc or annual basis.¹⁰⁰ This is an area that warrants serious consideration as part of a wider communities welcoming package.

An estimated direct cost of around \$250/year per child to participate a local sport club for a season we feel would provide for increased and ongoing contact between recent migrants and their host community over a number of months. Part-funding councils (with a matched contribution by local councils) to offer a limited number of sports scholarships each year to newcomers would be money well spent by central government. Alternatively, we could require migrants with primary school aged children to pre-fund sports programmes in a similar way to language courses, as part of their personalised settlement plan and acceptance for migration.

Mandatory contracts are not widely used

Only two of the 13 countries covered in the RCIS document (Spain and France) use mandatory contracts to require migrants to undertake compulsory settlement requirements. France uses the contract to cover both “language training (if necessary) and mandatory civic training courses...”¹⁰¹ There is limited rationale to introduce these restrictive policies in New Zealand, especially when the open New Zealand permanent resident visa can be adjusted from one with no conditions to include residency or renewal conditions like undertaking civics courses.

Many places empower regions to take a lead in settlement services

The authors of the RCIS comparative study point to “[a] nother cross-national development worthy of note,” which is “the overall movement toward the decentralization of settlement services to lower levels of government.”¹⁰² This devolution has many advantages including that the communities involved in settling are assisting in designing and carrying out these programmes. This means they are better able to respond to local issues as they arise. In Canada the use of public-private partnerships and the Local Immigration Partnership (LIPs) program involve the central government purchasing services from community-based organisations. A benefit of this approach is that “[b]y contracting with community based organizations governments send a message that they want to work in partnership with immigrant communities and that they trust them with government funds.”¹⁰³ There are also disadvantages to this public-private partnership model, insofar as “[i]t can foster a competitive environment among service providers which may hinder partnerships, coordination of service delivery and the sharing of information and best practices.”¹⁰⁴

There also appears to be a widespread devolution of settlement service costs away from central government toward lower levels of government, or even in some cases, to host communities themselves. As the RCIS document points out, in Canada this has led to funding gaps and a reliance on locally led volunteer initiatives. The devolution of costs can also be hidden. An example of this in the New Zealand context are the increasing demands on local schools that have children of recent migrants enrolling. While ESOL funding is available for schools there isn’t any increase in baseline funding to

reflect the increased broad needs that schools may face in educating the children of recent migrants other than the ability to pool the funding into a lump sum that can be spent in various ways.¹⁰⁵

Canada leads the way in enabling local policy variation

From a regional development perspective, Canada’s experience of their Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) highlights the benefits that regional flexibility in migrant nomination can bring. Under the PNP, “provinces and territories have the authority to nominate individuals as permanent residents to address specific labour market and economic development needs,”¹⁰⁶ and this is seen as responsible for an almost tripling in the rate of migrants settling outside of Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec. Small towns like Morden (with a population of around 10,000) use this program to be part of the selection of permanent migrants using their own criteria, and then fast track these through the national program to meet their own local skill requirements. For example, Morden’s Community Driven Immigration Initiative uses their own economic “centre-of-gravity” test to ensure that people they nominate have no other family members or means of support in other parts of Canada, thus maximising the probability of the family forming a centre of gravity in Morden itself.

Similarly Canada has the Canada-Québec Accord relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens, under which “Quebec has full responsibility for the selection of immigrants (except Family Class and in-Canada refugee claimants), as well as sole responsibility for delivering reception and integration services, supported by an annual grant from the federal government. Quebec also establishes its own immigration levels, develops its own related policies and programs, and legislates, regulates and sets its own selection criteria.”¹⁰⁷ Alongside this the Canadian national settlement program, specifically supports “Francophone minority communities through the initiatives announced in the Action Plan for Official Languages 2018–2023, including the development and consolidation of a Francophone integration pathway in collaboration with stakeholders in the Francophone settlement sector.”¹⁰⁸

In New Zealand, it would be possible to allow for more regional voice in the selection of those who meet the requirements of the point system or even allow additional

points to be given to individuals based on local priorities. This for example could provide be an opportunity within the current system for communities to further support and prioritise migrants who demonstrate their commitment to learning te reo Māori. This also gives regions a greater say in what they value for migrants to bring to or to learn from their community. Creating the conditions for additional regional voice in the selection of migrants should be seen as part of the wider move toward Welcoming Communities as discussed below.¹⁰⁹

Welcoming policy is a way of refocusing on the host to ensure they can welcome well

Welcoming policy—initiatives that are focused on supporting a community to welcome well—holds real potential for shifting toward a more longer-term migration perspective. This kind of policy flips the idea of settlement policy on its head—where the ability of the community to host well becomes a greater focus, rather than simply looking to the qualities of individual migrants. Welcoming policy frequently includes measures that ensure that a community makes local government services accessible to migrants, but can also include initiatives to educate against racism and ensure the community has a sense of responsibility to include and to learn from those that settle into their community. Welcoming programmes are gaining traction internationally with parts of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, America and the United Kingdom all participating in variations of welcoming policy.¹¹⁰

Welcoming policy is especially interesting from a regional development perspective as academics point out that:

regions do not compete for workers on the basis of comparative advantage, rather they need to compete on absolute advantage. The findings reinforce that rural and remote communities need to understand that the ideal job in the best organisation will not recruit or retain an employee if they or their family are not happy in the community. There needs to be a reason for people to live in a community besides work...¹¹¹

Within Canada, for example the Welcoming Communities Initiative (WCI) “focuses on creating connections between newcomers and Canadians, eliminating barriers to integration by creating welcoming communities, and educating against racism.”¹¹² In 2010, it covered 56 initiatives split between the state and federal level. The

Rural Community Awareness Program is an example of the kind of initiatives that receive funding, where recent migrants to share their stories, experiences, and culture to students in schools, “helping to dispel many pre-conceived notions that participants may have had about how newcomers are treated and settle in Canada.”¹¹³ The 2010 evaluation of the WCI found that WCI projects had a positive impact on both migrants, the receiving communities and the wider settlement sector “through the development of resources and tools, training and research to support program and policy development.”¹¹⁴

In Australia, “Welcoming Australia” was established in 2017 in partnership with a wide range of state and federal government institutions. It promotes a wide range of policy tools to assist in the welcoming of newcomers including using welcome centres, a city accreditation programme, the use of sport programmes, careers advice as well as a leadership programme for young migrants and indigenous people.¹¹⁵

In New Zealand, Southland was an early adopter of welcoming policy. Over ten years ago immigration researchers commented that “[w]hile Southland could not claim to have major opportunities for migrants in a dynamic urban economy, what it could do was promote a particular quality of life and a supportive local network to assist new immigrants to adjust to life in a new country.”¹¹⁶ This welcoming focus at the time was seen as Southland’s competitive advantage and led them to being on the forefront of regional population policy initiatives.

New Zealand has been running a two year Welcoming Communities Pilot Programme

More recently in New Zealand, a Welcoming Communities Pilot Programme covering the country was given the green light by Cabinet in 2017. This was part of the New Zealand Government’s wider 2014 Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy focused specifically on social inclusion. According to the programme’s intervention logic, the drivers for the welcoming pilot included escalating global anxiety over migration, rising negative perceptions of migration, and decreasing community tolerance of newcomers.¹¹⁷ The long-term aim of the pilot is to “support local councils and communities to create welcoming and inclusive environments for newcomers in order to foster a more inclusive society so that regions can attract and retain newcomers to address skill shortages and grow the local economy.”¹¹⁸

The pilot has seen ten local government councils hire a local Welcoming Co-ordinator (with this being part funded at \$50,000/position/year for two years).¹¹⁹ Their role is to help co-ordinate and implement the overall welcoming strategy, which has usually meant undertaking a stocktake of local welcoming activities and developing welcoming plans at the council level. MBIE has also ensured that wider governance arrangements are set up to support the co-ordinator locally as well as ensuring that monitoring and evaluation arrangements are in place.

An extremely wide range of welcoming activities have been undertaken within the pilot areas. The following examples give some idea of the scope of the initiatives:¹²⁰

- Ashburton joined with New Zealand Football, Immigration New Zealand and Mainland Football to deliver a “futsal extravaganza” with skills workshops, celebrity matches and a tournament rounding out the day;¹²¹
- In the Bay of Plenty the Te Puke Library hosts a weekly “Newcomers’ Network morning tea;”¹²²
- In Katikati the first ever “Festival of Cultures” mass parade took place “celebrating the town’s cultural diversity and the cultures of its residents and the many seasonal workers who contribute to the community and economy;”¹²³
- In Palmerston North a “New Kiwis Club” is running afterschool as part of a “#Palmy welcomes” campaign bringing together volunteers from a local high school and new comers to experience a range of activities like music, art, and informal sports together;¹²⁴ and
- In Invercargill, a 33-metre-high mural of a two year old New Zealand girl of Filipino, Japanese and Kiwi descent has been unveiled “symbolising... ..the new face of diversity in Invercargill...”¹²⁵

In a recent Cabinet paper, it was also noted that the local co-ordinators were able to play a key role in their communities in response to the March 15 2019 terror attacks.¹²⁶

Alongside the local welcoming work, MBIE (Immigration New Zealand) has (in consultation with the pilot participants and local councils) developed policy at a higher level, including having:

- developed a Welcoming Communities Standard for New Zealand, that “provides local councils and communities with a benchmark for what a successful welcoming community looks like;”¹²⁷
- produced a range of welcoming material to help co-ordinate and assist the local development of a welcoming plan;¹²⁸ and is
- “currently co-designing a Welcoming Communities accreditation model... [that if met] ...will set the community apart as being intentionally welcoming and inclusive.”¹²⁹

The interim evaluation of the pilot program (following its first year) highlighted four major findings, that:

- communities involved have seen a shift in focus, from “fitting in” to “welcoming;”
- there has been an overall shift in perceptions of diversity and newcomers;
- local councils are taking a more visible leadership role in promoting diversity and inclusion; and that
- there is growing community engagement and stronger links forming within communities.¹³⁰

It also highlighted a number of lessons to be learnt, including that

- early engagement with the community is vital;
- early direction on the accreditation process is needed;
- the role of the co-ordinator was critical to driving the programme;
- that funding conversations needed to start early both with the council, but also with wider funding sources; and
- a scoping phase to see if councils were ready and committed to the wider programme was required.¹³¹

*Cabinet has agreed to **expand Welcoming Communities Programme** up to an additional 30 sites—a positive move that should be supported*

Following the positive findings of the initial review, in late 2019, Cabinet agreed to expand the Welcoming Communities programme to 30 new sites over the next three years,¹³² whereby “[e]ach site would receive

\$50,000 establishment grant funding per year for three years to contribute to the cost of employing a dedicated Welcoming Communities coordinator.”¹³³ This in addition to MBIE resourcing over the expansion and in outyears brings the total spend to \$6.665M over four years (to be allocated from Immigration levy revenue).

While we support the expansion, we suggest that the focus on welcoming policy be broadened include the funding of initiatives aimed at inclusiveness and on-going contact within the wider community. For example, this could include innovative solutions aimed at addressing negative perceptions of local migrants along the lines of those illustrated within the WCI in Canada. It could also include the local co-ordination of history or civic courses for new migrants if these are developed. There is also room to include the formal use of sports programmes as a welcoming tool as outlined above.

Two keys to succession expansion were identified in the interim evaluation discussion: early engagement with the community and a scoping phase to see if local councils and communities are ready and committed to the wider programme. Part of this is engagement with local iwi and hapu to ensure that local Māori are an integral part of the conversation within the wider welcoming community. There is a risk that the expansion to 30 more sites might mean that in particular Māori communities are not brought along on the welcoming journey but will in effect have an idea of “welcoming” foisted upon them. Given the natural synergy that exists between the welcoming communities programme and the early work into a “tika” approach to migration as discussed earlier, there is a real opportunity to deepen these local relationships that should be taken before this pilot is rolled out further.

Overall conclusions on settlement and retention policy

Overseas evidence highlights that “a strong settlement sector, not only in large cities but also in rural and remote communities, is a key asset for the community to attract, welcome and retain newcomers.”¹³⁴ Unfortunately, New Zealand has taken a relatively hands-off approach to settlement services for the majority of its skill-based migrants when compared to many other jurisdictions. We have started to make some interventions in our use of pre-approval criteria aimed at matching immigration to skill needs, the use of pre-funded language courses for non-primary applicants and making some forms of labour market assistance available. This has all largely been implemented from the national level with regional variation only coming to the fore in recent years. If there has been a bright spot in recent times in New Zealand settlement and retention policy it has been the development of the Welcoming Communities Pilot Programme and its current extension. Areas for policy attention come to the fore fairly quickly when examining the wider literature. Having analysed and assessed the international and local evidence, we are now ready to make recommendations to improve our local immigration outcomes.

5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Reflecting back to the continued growth and on-going use of short-term migration solutions as a fix for what now appear to be long-term labour market problems, the evidence suggests that New Zealand is now developing a number of long-term negative structural issues. For example, while the use of temporary migration is a net benefit to the country, the spatial and personal impacts are less than universally positive. Evidence is emerging that in some locations (main non-urban areas) and types of work (horticulture for example) beneficiaries or young people are bearing the brunt of the negative effects. There is also evidence of an overreliance on temporary migration within some locations and types of work, especially in low skilled and precarious work which may well be impacting on incentives for firms to innovate or seek higher productivity solutions. These factors, combined with the precarious nature of temporary work visas and the inability to access healthcare or many of the support services available to permanent residents, mean there is a real risk of temporary migrant exploitation. In response, we make the following recommendations:

Policy recommendation 1: It is time to review the ongoing and repeated use of temporary work visas. We call for a freeze on the level of temporary work visa approvals at their current level. This would be the first step towards the gradual phasing out of the repeated use of low wage temporary visas as a way to meet ongoing skill shortages. Instead we would support a shift toward better long-term work migration solutions for low skill workers who would wish to live here permanently

It is time to review the repeated use of temporary work visas in specific locations and industries. If there is a sustained need for temporary migrants we would instead support a shift toward better long-term migration solutions. While we support the current policy of industry agreements in return for the continued use of temporary migration at one level, we feel the pace of agreements is too slow and ongoing labour needs means we should instead pivot towards the development of long-term migration arrangements for those in industries repeatedly using short-term migration solutions. Alongside this we would seek to redress the power imbalance that occurs when a temporary work visa is tied to an employer.

Policy recommendation 2: Allow temporary migrants to seek alternative employment within the same industry and location

Temporary Work Visas tied to one employer mean an employee cannot leave the employer and seek work elsewhere, effectively giving an employer monopsony power over the worker. We do not accept this level of bargaining imbalance anywhere else in our labour relations framework and it is time to reconsider its widespread use within temporary work visas. The current approach of using sector agreements and vetting specific employers is slow-moving, heavy-handed and almost totally reliant on sufficient enforcement mechanisms. This part of the labour market—as pointed out in the 2014 MBIE research—is contractually diverse and is extremely hard to enforce minimum standards in. Add to this multiple secondary barriers like language and culture differences and it seems likely that the incidence of migrant exploitation will continue unabated if further steps are not taken. The simplest solution is to provide temporary migrants the ability to seek alternative employment within the same industry, location, and timeframe of their original visa.

Policy recommendation 3: Within the current Welcoming Communities Programme move toward including a “tika” approach, even if this means taking longer to expand

Part of a move toward better long-term migration solutions could involve moving towards a “tika” approach, as outlined by academics Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata. The current Welcoming Communities Programme is pivotal and aligns well with this tika approach, and as such, we support the ongoing use of welcoming policy and recommend the expansion of the programme as agreed to by Cabinet. We do, however, have concerns about the fast rate of intended growth and we recommend steps are taken to ensure communities and local iwi and hapu are able to engage with the process and even develop what their local version of welcoming well might look like within the flexibility of the overall standard. Overall, we feel that the time is right for greater Māori voice in immigration policy and that the Welcoming Communities initiative might be a way of ensuring this voice is heard.

Policy recommendation 4: Expand the funding available within the Welcoming Communities Programme to include part provision for the scoping phase, innovative solutions aimed at addressing negative views towards migrants and the development of personalised settlement plans

We have concerns over the proposed funding arrangements for the expansion of the Welcoming Communities Programme, which may be insufficient to ensure long term positive outcomes. This is especially so given the findings of the interim evaluation, which included the need for communities to fully understand what it means to host well. Simply part-funding a co-ordinator role will not address the needs of communities to undertake the scoping phase well nor address underlying negative views regarding newcomers reported in New Zealand research. Indeed, as Robert Vineberg’s comprehensive history of immigration settlement in Canada spells out, “the best settlement program will fail in the absence of a welcoming community.”¹³⁵ Additional funding, therefore, should be made available to enable innovative solutions aimed at addressing host community needs in regard to the settlement of newcomers. To ensure local council and community buy-in the funding should use a co-contribution model whereby local council funding is matched by central government funding up to a fixed limit. This could include options to part-fund the local delivery of personalised settlement plans (also discussed below in Recommendation 7).

Policy recommendation 5: Within the context of an “accredited” Welcoming Community allow specialised nomination of applicants and additional points in line with local preferences

The time is also right for more local/regional input into the selection of migration needs. One possible solution is for an accredited welcoming community—one that meets the upcoming welcoming community standard—to be able to nominate individuals for additional localised points. This could mean that communities are able to give additional points toward a person who has a proven track record of learning te reo Māori in addition to having met the English requirements. Another example might be for a community to award extra points towards residency if the nominee commits to a location and meets a localised centre of gravity test whereby wider family members are also locating in one place. Within the context of an oversubscribed applicant pool, this would enable

applicants approved by local communities to rise to the top of the points pool and be fast tracked to residency.

Policy recommendation 6: Co-develop history courses to be delivered locally to adult migrants as part of the move toward compulsory history education in schools

The recent Government announcement that New Zealand history will be compulsory for all students demonstrates the value that our history has for being a member of society, and shows that it is appropriate to consider the development of history and eventually civics courses for all migrants aiming at residing for more than a year. This fits with the need to elevate the status of Māori within a tika migration approach. In the first instance it may be appropriate to incorporate elements of the compulsory New Zealand history curriculum currently being developed and extend this to a course for new migrants who are aiming for long term residency. This could be delivered through local schools with additional funding or even pre-purchased by migrants themselves as part of the personalised settlement plans that are covered in our next recommendation.

Policy recommendation 7: Make use of personalised settlement plans as a way to overcome information gaps in regard to settlement services

There is more than enough evidence to support the adoption of personalised settlement plans, whereby a customised settlement plan to meet individual migrants needs is agreed to pre or even post arrival in a local community. This would help overcome many of the information gaps migrants have self-reported in their experiences of settling and adjusting to life in New Zealand. These plans could be developed as part of the Welcoming Communities Programme and delivered locally as part of the additional funding include the use of new settlement assistance in the form of history courses (above) or sports programmes as discussed below. Funding for these courses could be prefunded by migrants themselves as part of their commitment to New Zealand long-term.

Policy recommendation 8: Adopt the formal use of sports programmes for children of newcomers

Given the positive use of sports programmes overseas and the encouraging results from individual sports initiatives taken within the Welcoming Communities Pilot Programme, we also recommend that New Zealand adopt the formal use of sport programmes as another tool for increasing positive contact between migrants and their wider communities. At an estimated cost of around \$250/child per year for the first 2 years, this would be a worthy investment to create contact points for not only the children but their parents too. These funds could be administered locally or even pre-funded by migrants themselves as part of a personalised settlement plan as outlined above.

Policy recommendation 9: Introduce residency requirements to maintain permanent residency

To help promote retention, there is also an opportunity to rethink New Zealand's current lack of any ongoing requirements to maintain Permanent Residency Status. New Zealand is unique in the world in that once you obtain Permanent Residency (PR) there are no residency requirements to maintain the status (other than the ability to have PR status revoked or not renewed following criminal activity). This greatly lowers the opportunity cost of leaving or seeing New Zealand as an insurance policy or back up plan for someone with PR status. It also eliminates the incentive and urgency for someone to consider becoming a New Zealand citizen. Instituting requirements to maintain PR status fits with the shift toward long-term migration and commitments both to New Zealand for the migrant and from New Zealand to the migrant. Someone should be required to live in New Zealand for 183 days (over each annual renewal cycle) if they wish to maintain their Permanent Residency status from one year to the next.

6. CONCLUSIONS

New Zealand needs rebalance away from its ever increasing use of temporary migration solutions as a way to address long-term labour market shortages. It needs to pivot toward a system that focuses more on long-term outcomes and social cohesion. To make this happen we need to empower our communities to welcome well and to focus on long term migration solutions and migrants—be they high or low skilled. Part of welcoming well will need to be listening better to indigenous peoples and making moves toward a “tika” system that really embodies manaakitanga and care for people. There is a strategic opportunity to take steps in this direction as part of the Welcoming Communities Programme expansion, potentially giving communities and local Māori more flexibility to influence policy decisions.


Alongside empowering our communities to welcome well, there are also a number of lessons we can learn from other countries when it comes to overall settlement policy. New Zealand needs to consider the use of civics courses, and a useful place to start would be developing history courses that could be delivered as part of the roll-out of compulsory history education in schools. Making use of personalised settlement plans to overcome information gaps and adopting the formal use of sports programmes as a way to encourage positive, multi-faceted interaction between recent migrants and host communities are key initiatives to assist communities to welcome well. This kind of connection building will do much to improve our long term attractiveness to migrants. We should stop accepting that tying a temporary work visa to an employer is the “Kiwi” way, and similarly, we should not be satisfied to confer Permanent Resident status on someone without any residence requirements attached.

Overall, we think it is time to revisit the aims and goals of New Zealand’s migration policy and attempt to rehumanise and re-tell this narrative. If nothing else, we hope this paper begins to challenge the notion that migration can simply be seen as a means to an end or a costless problem solver. Migration is not a costless exercise, and doing migration well means investing in the people we invite here to live and work. In reality, we are discussing real people, families, and communities and even “the best settlement program will fail in the absence of a welcoming community.”¹³⁶ Transforming New Zealand into a country that welcomes well will improve our ability to attract and retain migrants in the long-term, strengthen our communities, and for the people who choose to migrate here, it will improve their sense of belonging in our communities and our country.

APPENDIX A: BALLOONING DEPENDENCY RATIOS

Ballooning 65 years plus dependency ratios see roughly one third of all Territorial Authorities (TA), and all to the left of Napier City in Figure 8 below, experiencing ratios of 60 percent or higher.¹³⁷ This means there are more than 60 people aged 65+ for every 100 people aged between 15-65. Thames Coromandel as a retirement destination has by far the highest expected ratio of 98 people aged 65+ per 100 people aged 15-65 percent by 2043. Jackson’s theoretical 150,000 persons per year level of migration is also estimated to lead to a New Zealand population of 16.8 million by 2068.¹³⁸ Jackson and other New Zealand commentators like Julie Fry argue that there is little social licence for this level of migration.

Figure 8: SNZ: Subnational population projections: 65+ dependency ratio



Source: Statistics New Zealand, author's own calculation, data extracted on 15 Apr 2019 from NZ.Stat

APPENDIX B: RECENT IMMIGRATION ANNOUNCEMENTS

The median wage will be used to categorise people as high and low skill workers and underpin skills shortage labour market test requirements

It has also been announced that the median wage (~\$25/hr or ~\$53,000/year) will be used to categorise all temporary work visa pathway visas into different categories. Those jobs paying at or above the median wage will be seen as high-skill temporary workers, and those with jobs paying below the median wage will be seen as low-skill temporary workers.

“The duration of the visa granted and other visa conditions will be linked to remuneration: an easier labour market test and longer visa duration for jobs paying above the median wage; and a harder labour market test and shorter visa duration for jobs paying below the median wage.”¹³⁹

For example, no labour market test will be applied for workers who earn over double the median wage (~\$106,000/annum). Similarly, for regions outside of Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin no labour market test will be applied for those whose earn above the median wage (\$53,000/annum). “This gives open access to employers in the regions recruiting for jobs paying above the median wage.”¹⁴⁰ A labour market test will still apply for those wanting workers not earning double the median wage in our major centres, for those not on a skill shortage list or if the employer is not offering the median wage ~\$53,000/annum or ~\$25/hour.

And new regional skill lists will replace national skill shortage lists

On top of this earlier in 2019 the skill shortage lists that will be applied for those earning less than double the median in our major centres or the median in the regions have been replaced by a Regional Skills lists which are designed to allow for regional variability. Our analysis of these regional skill shortage lists show that further work remains to fully contextualise these regional lists to their local contexts. As they currently stand the vast majority of skills discussed are seen to be in shortage the country

over (see Box X: Analysis of Shift to Regional Skill Shortage List below). This further localisation is something we would encourage the Ministry to undertake with urgency.

Spousal and children access for low skilled workers reinstated but with work limitations

In 2019 the ability to bring spouses and children to New Zealand would be reinstated for lower skilled migrants (earning less than ~\$53,000/annum) with the additional requirement “that partners who would like to work are treated the same as other temporary migrant workers.”¹⁴¹ This according to the cabinet paper would re-enable up to 28,000 migrant workers to bring their spouses and children into New Zealand, although presumably a far smaller proportion of these spouses or children would qualify for a temporary work visa compared to those pre 2017.

Parent visas reinstated for those earning more than double the median wage

In 2019 it was announced that parent resident visa applications are re-opening in 2020 but with a limit of 1000 approvals a year and with new income level requirements for sponsors. If only one sponsor's income is being considered, the minimum income required is double the median wage (~\$106,000/annum) for one parent, and triple for two parents (~159,000/annum). If two sponsor's incomes are being considered, the minimum income requirements for one parent are triple the median wage (~159,000/annum) and 4 times the median for two parents (~212,000/annum).

APPENDIX C: ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFT TO REGIONAL SKILL SHORTAGES LIST

As highlighted in the Visual Analysis of Regional Skill Shortage lists below, 45 occupations are included in the regional Skill Shortages list. For these occupations 85 percent or 38 occupations and their exact same listed skill levels are in shortage in all 15 New Zealand regions. Only 7 occupations are not listed in each and every region.

- Mechanical Engineering Technician (312512) are only included in shortage the South Island Regions.
- Accountant (221111) are only in shortage in 7 regions,
- Medical Technicians nec (Dialysis Technician) (311299) are excluded from Auckland region but included in all other regions.
- Horse Trainer (Stallion Master) (361112) and Horse Trainer (Stud Groom) (361112) are only in shortage in the Waikato, Bay of Plenty, and Gisborne.
- Jockey (452413) are in shortage in 11 of the 15 regions,
- Snowsport Instructor (452314) in shortage in 9 regions, while somewhat surprisingly all regions appear to be in a Snowsport Instructor (including Technicians) (452314) occupational shortage.

Table 5: Visual analysis of regional skill shortages list 27 May 2019

Occupation and ANZSCO number	Region														
	Northland	Auckland	Waikato	Bay of Plenty	Gisborne	Hawke's Bay	Taranaki	Whanganui-Manawatu	Wellington	Nelson-Tasman	Marlborough	West Coast	Canterbury	Otago	Southland
Apiarist (121311)															
Arborist (362212)															
Beef Cattle Farmer (Farm Manager) (121312),															
Dairy Cattle Farmer (Farm Manager) (121313)															
Dairy Cattle Farmer (Assistant Farm Manager) (121313)															
Market Gardener (Crop Production/Agronomist Manager) (121221)															
Pig Farmer (Farm Manager or Assistant Farm Manager) (121318)															
Early Childhood (Pre-primary School) Teacher (241111)															
Primary School Teacher (241213)															
Post-Doctoral Fellow (classified under 242111 University Lecturer)															
Secondary School Teacher (241411)															
University Lecturer (242111)															
Mechanical Engineering Draughtsperson (312511)															
Mechanical Engineering Technician (312512)															
Accountant (221111)															
Anaesthetic Technician (311211)															
Medical Technicians nec (Dialysis Technician) (311299)															
Midwife (254111)															
Post 2nd year Resident Medical Officers (253112)															
Specialist Physician (General Medicine) (253311),															
Cardiologist (253312),															
Paediatrician (253321),															
Specialist Physicians nec (253399),															
Emergency Medicine Specialist (253912),															
Ophthalmologist (253914),															
Medical Practitioners nec (253999)															
Horse Trainer (Stallion Master) (361112)															
Horse Trainer (Stud Groom) (361112)															
Jockey (452413)															
Jockey (Trackwork Rider) (452413)															
Snowsport Instructor (452314)															
Snowsport Instructor (including Technicians) (452314)															
Baker (351111)															
Composite Technician (399999)															
Electronic Equipment Trades Worker (342313)															
Metal Casting Trades Worker (Foundry Moulder) (322114)															
Metal Fabricator (322311)															
Metal Machinist (First Class) (CNC Machinist) (323214)															
Motor Mechanic (General) (321211)															
Automotive Air Conditioning Technician (321211)															
Panelbeater (324111)															
Plastics Technician (399916)															
Plastics Technician (Plastics Engineer) (399916)															
Sheetmetal Trades Worker (322211)															
Vehicle Painter (324311)															

Source: <https://skillshortages.immigration.govt.nz/assets/uploads/immediate-skill-shortage-list.pdf> published 27 May 2019, Accessed 14 August 2019.

ENDNOTES

- 1 OECD, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: New Zealand 2014* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), 139, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264215658-en>; Keith McLeod and David Maré, *The Rise of Temporary Migration in New Zealand and Its Impact on the Labour Market*. (Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2013); Minister of Immigration and Minister for Workplace Relations and Safety, 'Cabinet Paper - Addressing Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation', 2018, <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/coef8d63e0/cabinet-paper-addressing-temporary-migrant-worker-exploitation.pdf>.
- 2 The Maxim Institute itself when making recommendations around foreign aid, advocated for an extension of the Regional Seasonal Employment (RSE) scheme. See Jane Silloway Smith, 'Being Better Neighbours: Improving New Zealand's Contribution to Foreign Aid and International Development' (Maxim Institute, June 2011), <https://www.maxim.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Foreign-Aid-Being-Better-Neighbours-Silloway-Smith.pdf>.
- 3 Ian Pool, 'Population Replacement, Nation-Building, Population Policy', *New Zealand Population Review* 42 (2016): 51.
- 4 Julian Wood, *Taking the Right Risks: Working Together to Revitalise Our Regions*, 2018.
- 5 Wood; Julie Fry and Peter Wilson, *Better Lives: Migration, Wellbeing and New Zealand*, BWB Texts (Wellington, New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books Limited, 2018), 111 This inability to counter these long term trends is largely due to two reasons. Firstly, the international literature highlights that migrants typically revert to the host countries demographic profile within two generations. Secondly, Natalie Jackson's demographic estimates for New Zealand highlight that migration in the order 150,000 persons per year would still not stop New Zealand's ballooning 65 years plus dependency ratios all the while leading to a New Zealand population of 16.8 million by 2068. Jackson and other New Zealand commentators like Julie Fry argue that there is little social licence for this level of migration.
- 6 Peter Skilling, 'Immigration Policy in New Zealand: Divergent Narratives, Shared Assumptions and National Identity', *Critical Policy Studies* 6, no. 4 (December 2012): 371, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2012.730765>.
- 7 Paul Spoonley and Richard Bedford, 'Responding to Regional Labour Demand: International Migration and Labour Markets in New Zealand's Regions', *Journal of International Migration and Integration / Revue de l'integration et de La Migration Internationale* 9, no. 2 (June 2008): 203, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-008-0056-x>.
- 8 Fiona Barker, 'Maximizing the Migration Policy Buck: Uniting Temporary Labor, Development and Foreign Policy Goals in New Zealand', *Policy and Society* 29, no. 4 (November 2010): 321, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2010.09.008> temporary labor migration schemes can be seen to serve a multiplicity of policy goals, including development, foreign policy, public diplomacy and trade objectives. The paper examines state motivations, policy design and goals across three temporary worker programs in New Zealand – the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE
- 9 Richard Bedford and Paul Spoonley, 'Competing for Talent: Diffusion of An Innovation in New Zealand's Immigration Policy', *International Migration Review* 48, no. 3 (September 2014): 893, <https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12123>.
- 10 This relative ease of excludability is mirrored in the low-level concern that New Zealand has around the amount of illegal resident migrants.
- 11 The "theory of clubs is, in one sense, a theory of optimal exclusion, as well as one of inclusion." James M. Buchanan, 'An Economic Theory of Clubs', *Economica* 32, no. 125 (February 1965): 13, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2552442>.
- 12 Under conditions where crowding out, congestion and rivalry of use occur, the marginal benefit curve of the club (as indicated in figure X above) is downward sloping which means it decreases as you add additional members. This is because you are sharing the total benefit of membership with an additional member thus lowering the average benefit to all members. The marginal cost curve also decreases as you add and additional member as the costs of the club are spread over more people in total.
- 13 Dave Grimmond, 'Concepts Underpinning Immigration Policy' (Department of Labour, 9 December 2005).
- 14 That Maori commentators have continually pushed back against this centralised and state lead approach to migration speaks volumes about the difficulty to move the dominant narrative.
- 15 Louise Humpage and Lara Greaves, "'Truly Being a New Zealander": Ascriptive versus Civic Views of National Identity', *Political Science* 69, no. 3 (2 September 2017): 247–63, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2017.1418177>.
- 16 Humpage and Greaves, 254.
- 17 Humpage and Greaves, 259.
- 18 Humpage and Greaves, 259.
- 19 Ron Johnston et al., 'Immigration, Multiculturalism and Geography: Inter-Group Contact and Attitudes to Immigrants and Cultural Diversity in New Zealand', *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 19, no. 3 (September 2010): 362, <https://doi.org/10.1177/011719681001900303>.
- 20 Johnston et al., 363.
- 21 see Ward, C. and A-M. Masgoret 2008 "Attitudes toward Immigrants, Immigration, and Multiculturalism in New Zealand: a Social Psychological Analysis," *International Migration Review*, 42(1):227-248. cited in Johnston et al., 364.
- 22 The different categories reported in the table are for study are those born in New Zealand with both parent New Zealand born, overseas born recent migrants (migrants living in New Zealand for less than 12 years) and overseas born long-term migrants who have been living in New Zealand for more than 12 years.
- 23 Ranginui J Walker, 'New Zealand Immigration and the Political Economy', *The Social Contract* 4, no. 2 (Winter -94 1993): 286.
- 24 Walker, 301.
- 25 Tariana Turia, 'Maori Concerns Can Not Be Brushed Aside', *The Maori Party*, 2 February 2007, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0702/S00047.htm>.
- 26 Tariana Turia.
- 27 Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, 'From Mainstream to Manaaki: Indigenising Our Approach to Immigration', in *Fair Borders? Migration Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, BWB Texts (Wellington, New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books Limited, 2017), 27 They also outline that "some Maori are uneasy about rising immigration and that this reflects: the inevitability of losing 'majority minority' status; implications of this demographic shift for Maori political power; the perceived competition for jobs and cultural resources; and uncertainty over the status of the Treaty and biculturalism.
- 28 Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, 40–41.
- 29 Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, 40.
- 30 Richard Benton et al., eds., *Te Mātāpunenga: A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law* (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2013).

31 Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, 'From Mainstream to Manaaki: Indigenising Our Approach to Immigration', 41.

32 Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, 41.

33 Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, 42.

34 Tahu Kukutai and Arama Rata, 'From Mainstream to Manaaki: Indigenising Our Approach to Immigration' But also bigger constitutional transformation.

35 Ming-Yi Wu and Julie Ray, 'Many Worldwide See Communities as Good for Immigrants' (Gallup, 30 October 2012), <https://news.gallup.com/poll/158438/worldwide-communities-good-immigrants.aspx>.

36 The other category while small in visa numbers is large complexity due to the number of visa types available. For example the OECD outlines that in 2011/12 New Zealand had a total of 11 Temporary Work Visa Categories with a total of 42 sub-category temporary work visas available. See OECD, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers*, 139.

37 'Migration Trends 2016/2017' (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, March 2018), <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/c22ab0c547/migration-trends-2016-17.pdf>.

38 See table 4.3 in 'Migration Trends 2016/2017', 32.

39 It is also important to acknowledge 'temporary worker programs have existed since the 1950s–1960s, when unskilled and semi-skilled labor was recruited from Pacific Island states to assist New Zealand's expanding industrial sector' see Barker, 'Maximizing the Migration Policy Buck', 323.

40 OECD, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers*, 139; Keith McLeod and David Maré, *The Rise of Temporary Migration in New Zealand and Its Impact on the Labour Market*; Minister of Immigration and Minister for Workplace Relations and Safety, 'Cabinet Paper - Addressing Temporary Migrant Worker Exploitation'.

41 The group with the lowest transition rates, as one would expect are those who entered on the Working Holiday Visa. Only 1 percent or 2,628 of these had transitioned to the residence stream. For those that did transition, 68% or 1,787 people transitioned to a skilled Migrant visa. Thus we choose to exclude the WHV from the overall transition calculations and report the percent of temporary migrants that transition to a permanent visa as 46 percent.

42 Table 5.6 in 'Migration Trends 2016/2017', 40.

43 'Migration Trends 2016/2017', 45.

44 'Migration Trends 2016/2017', 57.

45 Arthur Grimes et al., 'The Contrasting Importance of Quality of Life and Quality of Business for Domestic and International Migrants', *Motu Working Paper Series*, June 2019, 30.

46 The answers are coded from 1 = the best and brightest leave to pursue opportunities in other countries; to 7 = the best and brightest stay and pursue opportunities in the country.

47 *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Norway 2014* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), DOI:<https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264226135-en>.

48 *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Norway 2014*.

49 Eric Krassoi-Peach, 'How Permanent Is Permanent Migration? Identifying the Determinants of Remigration for Skilled Migrants in New Zealand' (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, September 2013), 31, <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/.../2737-how-permanent-is-permanent-migration-pdf>.

50 New Zealand's five-year retention rate appears high compared to other OECD countries which may be partly attributable to the fact that many migrants are already living here on a temporary visa when they apply for a permanent residency and hence have a sense of knowing what they are committing to.

51 Krassoi-Peach, 'How Permanent Is Permanent Migration? Identifying the Determinants of Remigration for Skilled Migrants in New Zealand', 31.

52 OECD, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers*, 134.

53 McLeod, K., A. Henderson and J. Bryant (2010), "Leaving So Soon? Skilled Migrants in New Zealand: Who Stays and Who Goes?", Department of Labour, Wellington. cited in OECD, 132.

54 OECD (2012), *Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2012-en>. cited in OECD, 132.

55 OECD, 139.

56 Office of the Minister of Immigration, 'Cabinet Paper - A New Approach to Employer-Assisted Work Visas and Regional Workforce Planning' (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 18 December 2018), 6, <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/have-your-say/consultation-on-a-new-approach-to-employer-assisted-work-visas-and-regional-workforce-planning/> based on figure 1.

57 Statistics New Zealand, 'Household Labour Force Survey June 2019 Quarter', 6 August 2019, <https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/labour-market-statistics-june-2019-quarter> HLFQSI3S June 2017 quarter.

58 Julie Fry and Peter Wilson, *Better Lives*, 52.

59 Office of the Minister of Immigration, 'Cabinet Paper - A New Approach to Employer-Assisted Work Visas and Regional Workforce Planning', 28, Annex 2.

60 Office of the Minister of Immigration, 28, Annex 2.

61 Statistics New Zealand, 'Industrial Classification', accessed 9 December 2019, <http://archive.stats.govt.nz/methods/classifications-and-standards/classification-related-stats-standards/industrial-classification.aspx>.

62 Office of the Minister of Immigration, 'Cabinet Paper - A New Approach to Employer-Assisted Work Visas and Regional Workforce Planning', 6.

63 'Impact of Temporary Migration on Employment and Earnings of New Zealanders: Update of 2103 Analysis' (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, June 2018), iii, <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/4241-impact-of-temporary-migration-on-employment-earnings-new-zealanders>.

64 'Impact of Temporary Migration on Employment and Earnings of New Zealanders: Update of 2103 Analysis', iv.

65 'Impact of Temporary Migration on Employment and Earnings of New Zealanders: Update of 2103 Analysis', iv.

66 'Impact of Temporary Migration on Employment and Earnings of New Zealanders: Update of 2103 Analysis', v.

67 'Impact of Temporary Migration on Employment and Earnings of New Zealanders: Update of 2103 Analysis', v.

68 Figure 2 in Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley, 'Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A Literature Review' (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, March 2014), 50, <https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/fms/Research/ntom/Yuan%20Cain%20and%20Spoonley%202014.pdf?23A2Fo83283EE192CA49A530EA4B72F8>.

- 69 'Eligibility Questions and Answers for Consumers' (Ministry of Health), accessed 9 September 2019, <https://www.health.govt.nz/new-zealand-health-system/eligibility-publicly-funded-health-services/eligibility-questions-and-answers-consumers>.
- 70 Ministry of Education, 'Definition of a Domestic Student in New Zealand', accessed 9 September 2019, <http://www.education.govt.nz/our-work/legislation/definition-of-domestic-student/>.
- 71 Temporary permit includes a visitor's permit, a limited purposes permit, a temporary work permit or a permit to be in New Zealand for the purposes of study at a New Zealand school or tertiary educational establishment see 'Residency Requirements for New Zealand Benefits and Pensions' (Work and Income), accessed 9 September 2019, <https://www.workandincome.govt.nz/pensions/travelling-or-moving/moving-to-nz/residency-requirements-for-new-zealand-benefits-and-pensions.html#null>.
- 72 Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley, 'Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A Literature Review', 9 The report found that "employee vulnerability commonly manifests in: contractual issues (eg. not receiving a contract or contract substitution); payment of wages (eg. no payment, late payment, underpayment, and no provision of holiday or sickness payments); hours of work (eg. excessive hours, unsociable hours and non-guaranteed hours); lack of job security (eg. no provision of termination notice); concerns around occupational safety and health (OSH) (eg. high injury rates and fatalities in the workplace and lack of adequate workplace training); and work-family relations (eg. lacking quality family time, transnational motherhood and separation from adult children).
- 73 Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley, 112.
- 74 Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley, 119.
- 75 Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley, 119.
- 76 Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain, and Paul Spoonley, 118.
- 77 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 'Changes to Employer-Assisted Temporary Work Visas — Overview' (Immigration.govt.nz, September 2019), 4, <https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/about-us/changes-employer-assisted-temporary-work-visas-overview.pdf>.
- 78 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 4.
- 79 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 10.
- 80 Riley Bushell and John Shields, 'Immigrant Settlement Agencies in Canada: A Critical Review of the Literature through the Lens of Resilience', 9 October 2019, 19.
- 81 Karen Becker, Paul Hyland, and Claudine Soosay, 'Labour Attraction and Retention in Rural and Remote Queensland Communities', *Australasian Journal of Regional Studies* 19, no. 3 (2013): 358.
- 82 These spillovers can work in both directions. There are positive spillovers from initiatives aimed at countering racism toward recent migrants for second and third generation naturalised citizens who share characteristics with recent migrants.
- 83 New Zealand Immigration, 'The New Zealand Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy', 2014, <http://gdsindexnz.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GDS118-Migrant-Settlement-and-Integration-Strategy.pdf>.
- 84 Paul Spoonley and Carina L Meares, 'Laissez-Faire Multiculturalism and Relational Embeddedness: Ethnic Precincts in Auckland', *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 3, no. 1 (24 March 2011): 55, <https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v3i1.1590>.
- 85 John Shields, Julie Drolet, and Karla Valenzuela, 'Immigrant Settlement and Integration Services and the Role of Nonprofit Providers: A Cross-National Perspective on Trends, Issues and Evidence', *RCIS Working Paper Series 2016/1* (February 2016): 64.
- 86 Shields, Drolet, and Karla Valenzuela, 24, 25.
- 87 Spoonley and Meares, 'Laissez-Faire Multiculturalism and Relational Embeddedness', 55.
- 88 Johnston et al., 'Immigration, Multiculturalism and Geography', 365.
- 89 Martin Jenkins, 'National Migrant Consultations 2018: Recent Migrants Experiences of Settling and Adjusting to Life in New Zealand' (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, September 2018), 4, <https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/about-us/national-migrant-consultations-2018.pdf>.
- 90 OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2016*, 40th ed. (Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2016) cited in OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2017*, 41st ed. (Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2017), 157.
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